Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan

Kubo, Katsuyuki

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x

Cited by 55 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Previous studies are inconclusive in showing the influence of management pay incentives on firm performance. Some studies have found a relationship (Cordeiro et al, 2000;Dalton et al, 2003;Ryan & Wiggins, 2004), whereas others have not (Kubo, 2005;Vafeas, 1999). As in other variables, previous research results seem contradictory.…”

Section: Independence Of Board Members and Performancecontrasting

confidence: 43%

Governance Mechanisms and Performance of Publicly Traded Companies

Felício¹,

Galindo-Villardón²

2014

IJBM

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Rooted in agency theory, this study analyzes the relationship between governance mechanisms and the performance of listed firms in countries with different levels of economic development and shareholding concentration. The study uses graphic representations of the HJ-Biplot method to perform holistic analysis. This method is effective for qualitative evaluation of relationships. Based on observations from 146 listed companies, this study compares two different contexts and governance backgrounds. Results show that governance mechanisms affect firm performance differently depending on whether firms are operating in a context characterized by concentration or dispersion of voting rights. Sector and company size also influence corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. This holistic approach yields important contributions to the literature because, despite the number of studies that exist, there is still insufficient understanding of how specific governance mechanisms affect company valuation and performance. This study demonstrates the importance and influences that sector of activity, company size, and context have in developing proper corporate governance mechanisms.

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Section: Independence Of Board Members and Performancecontrasting

confidence: 43%

Governance Mechanisms and Performance of Publicly Traded Companies

Felício¹,

Galindo-Villardón²

2014

IJBM

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“…Japanese firms, at least for a large part of the postwar period, arguably sought non-financial goals, such as market share or employment, rather than financial objectives, such as profits or shareholder value (Aoki 1990;Porter 1990;Abegglen & Stalk 1985;Tsuru 1996;Geringer et al 1999;Ahmadjian & Robbins 2005;Kubo 2005; and others); though others dissent (e.g. Shivdasani 1995, 1997).…”

Section: Sales and Employment Growthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms

Mehrotra

Mørck

Shim

et al. 2011

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The practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese family firms unusually competitive. Our nearly population-wide panel of postwar listed nonfinancial firms shows inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing wellan unusual finding for a developed economy. Adopted heirs' firms outperform blood heirs' firms, and match or nearly match founder-run listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs' firms outperform non-family firms. Using family structure variables as instruments, we find adopted heirs "causing" elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing blood heirs in the left tail of the talent distribution, with the "adopted son" job motivating star managers, and with the threat of displacement inducing blood heirs to invest in human capital, mitigating the so-called "Carnegie conjecture" that inherited wealth deadens talent.

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“…Comparative research has stressed the weaker effects of equity-based incentives in the UK and Germany (Bruce et al, 2005) or the absence of a link between high pay for performance sensitivity in executive pay and financial performance in Japan (Kubo, 2005). Crossnationally comparative research has therefore also further sensitized researchers to how different sets of institutions modify the basic principal-agent relationship by providing different sets of incentives, resources, and understandings of corporate governance.…”

Section: From the Principal-agency Dichotomy Towards A Comparative Inmentioning

confidence: 99%