Executive Compensation in Municipalities

Goldstein, Gerald S.; Ehrenberg, Ronald G.

doi:10.2307/1056354

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Goldstein and Ehrenberg (1976) provide additional support for the equal incentive theory with their earlier finding that CM and EMC did not consistently differ in their rewards for efficient performance.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 64%

Form of Government and Collective Bargaining Outcomes

O’Brien

1992

Public Finance Quarterly

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The purpose of this study is to determine which form of government, city manager or elected mayor, is more successful in minimizing labor costs. The two competing theories are the city manager efficiency theory, which argues that city managers are more successful than mayors in restraining labor costs, and the equal incentive theory, which argues that both forms of government are equally adept at restraining labor costs. Differing from earlier studies, these theories are examined here explicitly within a collective bargaining framework, where labor costs are frequently determined in the local public sector. To empirically test which theory is valid, national cross-sectional samples of cities with bargaining units for police and firefighters were collected. Contrary to previous studies, it is found for the police sample that mayors are actually more efficient than city managers. For the firefighter sample the results support the equal incentive theory. The general conclusion from both samples is that city managers are not more efficient than mayors and may actually be less efficient.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 64%

Form of Government and Collective Bargaining Outcomes

O’Brien

1992

Public Finance Quarterly

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“…Since elected officials seldom can appropriate the gains from enhancing public sector efficiency, it is unlikely that they will monitor managers in a fashion that achieves consistent pressure for economic efficiency.3 With regard to (b), Goldstein and Ehrenberg [19] attempted to determine whether city manager salaries are related to improvements in governmental performance, and whether a difference in the reward structure exists between CM and EMC cities. (b) Are a city manager's rewards (salary increases, promotions, etc.)…”

Section: Median Voter Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Municipal Management Structure and Fiscal Performance: Do City Managers Make a Difference?

Deno¹,

Mehay²

1987

Southern Economic Journal

109

107

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“…The extensive literature on corporate CEOs shows that their compensation is often either explicitly or implicitly structured to provide incentives for them to act in their shareholders' interests (Murphy, 1999). Incentives also apparently exist in the compensation structures of such appointed government executives as city managers and school superintendents, encouraging them to act in their constituents' interests (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, & Ehrenberg, 1988;Goldstein & Ehrenberg, 1976). However, the few studies that have addressed private college and university presidents' compensation have used only crosssection data to explain differences in compensation across institutions (Boulanger & Pliskin, 1999;Pfeffer, & Ross, 1988).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%