Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

Abstract

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CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences, and Consequences

“…Turnover rates may also vary across countries and possibly affect the relation between tournaments and value creation. Finally, our measures use reported compensation that do not take into account other benefits that are unreported; for instance, Kato and Long (2006) estimate executives perks as 15%-32% of compensation in Chinese firms. These perks likely increase with compensation and therefore the steepness of our tournament for China may be understated.…”

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

“…This extends our understanding of the governance roles of executive compensation beyond the confines of agency framework. Research in other Asian countries have also shown stakeholder influence on executive pay in South Korea (Kato, Kim, & Lee, 2005) or the importance of relationship and network influences in China (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006;Kato & Long, 2006), even despite newer elements of ''stock market capitalism'' after the Chinese economic reforms. Buck, Liu & Skovoroda (2008: 4) suggest that "Chinese institutions (including culture as an informal institution) may have inhibited the adoption of long-term incentives in the form of equity-based pay, and thus reduced the responsiveness of pay to share price performance.…”

Relationship between CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Evidences from Malaysia Listed Firms

“…Sales growth is shown to be significantly linked to executive compensation (Kato and Long, 2004) and that Chinese executives are penalized for making negative profit although they are neither penalized for declining profit nor rewarded for rising profit insofar as it is positive. Kato and Long (2004) also found that in China the ownership structure on China"s listed firms has important effects on pay-performance link in these firms. Firstly, state of ownership of China"s listed firms is weakening pay-performance link for top managers and thus making China"s listed firms less effective in solving agency problem.…”