Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

Recent developments in German corporate governance

“…Kraft and Niederprüm (1999)). Elston and Goldberg (2003) investigate the monetary compensation of the members of the management and supervisory boards of German firms and confirm the results of Schmid (1997). First, although the size effect (positively) dominates the compensation equation, there exists a positive sensitivity of managerial pay to company performance in Germany.…”

“…This relation is confirmed by Conyon and Schwalbach (2000b). Second, the Elston and Goldberg (2003) study shows that managers and directors of widely-held firms receive a substantially higher monetary compensation than those of firms with large blockholders. Third, firms with monitoring house banks (which own an equity stake, are major providers of loan capital and frequently have board representation) generally pay managers and directors comparatively less than widely held firms.…”

How Does CEO Compensation in U.S Corporations Compare with European and British Firms? A Review of the Literature

“…These CEOs were usually founders of the company or their family members and were more concerned with influencing the pay level and structure of their subordinates. Elston and Goldberg (2001) found that executives of German firms, as with executives of U.S. firms, have lower levels of compensation as their ownership concentration increases. No matter the structure or members of the corporate board, they are a prominent factor in determining CEO compensation and shaping corporate strategy.…”

Beyond human capital explanations for the gender pay gap among executives: investigating board embeddedness effects on discrimination

“…Fig. 1 Moderating effects of number of interlocks and centrality on the relationship between gender and compensation 2011; Elston and Goldberg 2003;Shipilov et al 2010). We also used another definition of leverage using long-term total debt divided by total assets.…”