Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries

Hallerberg, Mark; Marier, Patrik

doi:10.2307/1519917

Cited by 77 publications

(130 citation statements)

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“…And generally we see fiscal transfers are linked to institutional rules (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). For instance Hallerberg and Marier (2004) found that the decision rule has an impact on budgetary spending in Latin America. But, except in the US, the mechanisms through which GTS is delivered are ignored.…”

Section: Theories Of Partisan Spendingmentioning

confidence: 94%

Yes, Minister: The Impact of Decision-making Rules on Geographically Targeted Particularistic Spending

Suiter

O’Malley

2013

Parliam Aff

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Section: Theories Of Partisan Spendingmentioning

confidence: 94%

Yes, Minister: The Impact of Decision-making Rules on Geographically Targeted Particularistic Spending

Suiter

O’Malley

2013

Parliam Aff

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“…This is a significant paper in the growing literature on the effect of electoral rules on microlevel political behavior (Chang 2008;Chang et al 2011;Gagliarducci et al 2011;Golden and Picci 2008;Hallerberg and Marier 2004;Iversen and Soskice 2006;Lizzeri and Persico 2001;Park and Jensen 2007;Persson and Tabellini 2003;Primo and Snyder 2010;Wright 2010). Our re-estimation of the main model in the paper, using thresholds of varying district magnitudes rather than a continuous Seats variable, refines the results in PSE in a subtle, but important, way.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 53%

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation

Carey

Hix

2012

Public Choice

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Drawing on new data that combine recorded votes from the Swiss National Assembly with canton-level referendum results on identical legislative proposals, Portmann et al. (Public Choice 151:585-610, 2012) develop an innovative strategy to identify the effect of district magnitude on the relationship between representatives and their constituents. We replicate PSE's central result and also estimate a related model that allows for the possibility of non-monotonicity in the relationship between district magnitude and representatives' deviance from referendum median voters. Our results indicate that representatives elected in low-magnitude multi-member districts deviate from canton-level majorities less than either MPs from single-member districts or those from high-magnitude multi-member districts.Keywords Representation · Electoral systems · District magnitude · Switzerland 1 Portmann, Stadelmann, and Eichenberger's study and expectations about voter-legislator congruenceIn "District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Portmann et al. (2012) (henceforth PSE) apply an ingenious research design to a novel set of data to estimate the effect of district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a given district) on Swiss legislators' congruence with positions embraced by majorities of voters. The main empirical finding in the paper-that the more seats elected in a district, the greater the likelihood that a given MP will deviate in a legislative vote from the preferences of his or her district majority-raises important normativeThis comment refers to the article available at

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“…As argued elsewhere (e.g., Hallerberg and Marier, 2004;Hallerberg and Scartascini, 2010), some electoral systems encourage a personal vote while others lead to a party vote. For example, under the Brazilian system of open-list proportional representation where voters determine the order of the candidates on the list, congresspersons have an incentive to appeal to very narrow segments of a given electoral district's population (see Ames, 1995).…”

Section: Fiscal Reforms In Latin Americamentioning

confidence: 77%

“…To measure the potential CPR problem, we use a measure for the personal vote first introduced in Hallerberg and Marier (2004). The index considers the extent to which the electoral system for the lower house of the legislature encourages candidates for office to appeal to a vote for themselves over a vote for a given political party.…”

Section: Political Explanations Of Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America

Hallerberg

Scartascini

2011

SSRN Journal

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Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries

Cited by 77 publications

References 0 publications

Yes, Minister: The Impact of Decision-making Rules on Geographically Targeted Particularistic Spending

Yes, Minister: The Impact of Decision-making Rules on Geographically Targeted Particularistic Spending

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation

Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America

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