Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

Amelio, Andréa; Giardino-Karlinger, Liliane; Valletti, Tommaso

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102592

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…A conclusion of excessive entry accommodation is also reached by Vasconcelos (2015) in a model where an installed base of locked-in consumers on both sides of the market provides incumbency advantage. By contrast, in a sequential pricing game with fixed costs, Amelio et al (2020) establishes the existence of consumer harmful entry deterrence for some intermediate range of entry cost. Overall, while establishing the possibility of inefficient barriers to entry, the literature is not conclusive.…”

Section: Exclusionary Pricingmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

Jullien

Sand‐Zantman

2021

Information Economics and Policy

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We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyse competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections.

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Section: Exclusionary Pricingmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

Jullien

Sand‐Zantman

2021

Information Economics and Policy

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“…Examples include Amelio, Karlinger, and Valletti (), Armstrong and Wright (), Behringer and Filistrucchi (), Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (), Katz (), and Lee (), and references therein.…”

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confidence: 99%

Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

Katz

2019

Economics Manag Strategy

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Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms. K E Y W O R D Santitrust enforcement, platform economics, rebuttable presumption "Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent mocks the majority's economic reasoning, as will most economists, including the creators of the "two-sided markets" theory on which the court relied. The court used academic citations in the worst way possibleto take a pass on reality." -Wu (2018b) commenting on the Supreme Court's American Express opinion.

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“…Cuando uno de los grupos posee una elasticidad a la demanda más baja -prefiere pagar más a dejar de consumir-, la plataforma puede cobrar el costo del servicio al primer grupo, mientras subsidia al segundo. Así, mediante las externalidades, las plataformas crecen atrayendo usuarios por un servicio sin costo, en un lado del mercado, que monetizan en el otro (Amelio, Giardino-Karlinger, & Valletti, 2020). Mientras que los usuarios no pagan un costo monetario por utilizar el servicio, los anunciantes publicitarios incurren en un gasto para acceder a su atención.…”

Section: Estructura Del Trabajounclassified

Regulaciones antitrust para Silicon Valley

Komissarov¹

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Esta tesis analiza las regulaciones antimonopolio de los Estados Unidos para Facebook y Google, junto a sus efectos sobre la competencia, en el mercado de las plataformas digitales. Una particular combinación de economías de escala y externalidades de red; sumada a la extracción, recolección, almacenamiento y análisis de datos personales, permite que ambas empresas detenten un poder de mercado dentro de la publicidad digital. Su posición dominante incrementa el precio a los anunciantes publicitarios, deteriora la privacidad de los usuarios, afecta el libre flujo de información en la red, e impide la innovación tecnológica. Durante 2019, estas conductas anticompetitivas motivaron la investigación de las autoridades estadounidenses sobre las industrias de Silicon Valley. El 4 de febrero del 2021, el Subcomité Judicial en Defensa de la Competencia y los Derechos del Consumidor, presentó un proyecto para reformar las leyes antimonopolio. Por su parte, el 24 de junio del 2021, el Comité Judicial de la Cámara de Representantes aprobó un paquete legislativo con cuatro leyes orientadas a regular las conductas anticompetitivas de las plataformas digitales. En esta tesis se analizan las reformas propuestas al marco jurídico antimonopolio y las regulaciones específicas destinadas a las plataformas para promover la competencia en el sector tecnológico.

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Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

Cited by 15 publications

References 20 publications

The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

Regulaciones antitrust para Silicon Valley

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