Excess entry in an experimental winner-take-all market

Fischbacher, Urs; Thöni, Christian

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This result is similar to the findings ofFischbacher and Thöni (2008), who also investigate endogenous entry into contests (with opportunity cost being an outside option) and find that often contests elicit excessive entry relative to the SPNE 33. A follow up study byMorgan et al (2012b) shows that there is neither over nor under-entry when the lottery contest is replaced with the proportional-prize contest.…”

supporting

confidence: 82%

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multibattle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 82%

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The model generalizes 'winner-take-all markets' (Frank and Cook, 1995;Lutter, 2013) and is a fruitful expansion of classic market-entry models that have been previously used to describe situations such as these (e.g. Fischbacher and Thö ni, 2008). It is worth mentioning that Boudon applied a variant of his model to analyse the effects of educational institutions on individual decisions (Boudon, 1979: 55-60; see also Raub, 1984: ch.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Logic of Relative Frustration: Boudon’s Competition Model and Experimental Evidence

Berger

Diekmann

2015

Eur Sociol Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An improvement in the availability of opportunities for actors in a social system (e.g. a society or a firm) can coincide with a growing rate of frustrated individuals. For instance, uprisings have repeatedly been preceded by forms of political liberalization that have provided greater opportunities (the so-called Tocqueville paradox). In organizations, satisfaction with regard to promotion opportunities can be negatively associated with objective chances of promotion. Raymond Boudon has proposed a game-theoretic competition model, which specifies the micro-mechanisms that produce these puzzling phenomena at the aggregate level and clarifies the conditions under which they emerge. We conducted three laboratory experiments to test the model's predictions, making our study the first empirical test of Boudon's model. The results are mixed: when opportunities increased, the rate of the relatively frustrated losers in the group remained constant, or increased only slightly. However, when applying another aggregation rule, which accounts for all social comparison processes and does not merely focus on the losers, an increase in relative frustration under improved conditions was observed. Our results imply that under specific conditions, there is a trade-off between opportunities and social mobility, on the one hand, and social inequality and relative frustration, on the other.

show abstract

“…We suspect that active participation has previously been an issue because, despite predictions that individual incentives should outperform team incentives (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;Holmström, 1982), several published studies, and perhaps even more unpublished studies, have failed to observe such differences (van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). While experimental market research (Lei et al, 2001;Fischbacher and Thöni, 2008) has provided support for the Active Participation Hypothesis, laboratory studies in experimental labor economics have yet to focus on effects of available alternatives such as "real-leisure".…”

Section: Studying Incentives In the Labmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

On-the-job leisure is a pervasive feature of the modern workplace. We studied its impact on work performance in a laboratory experiment by either allowing or restricting Internet access. We used a 2×2 experimental design in which subjects completing real-effort work tasks could earn cash according to either individual-or team-production incentive schemes. Under team pay, production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available than when it was not. Under individual pay, however, no differences in production levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in which it was not. In line with standard incentive theory, individual pay outperformed team pay across all periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was available. This was not the case, however, when Internet browsing was unavailable. These results demonstrate that the integration of on-the-job leisure activities into an experimental labor design is crucial for uncovering incentive effects.

show abstract

Excess entry in an experimental winner-take-all market

Cited by 30 publications

References 24 publications

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

The Logic of Relative Frustration: Boudon’s Competition Model and Experimental Evidence

Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About