Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design

Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.003

Cited by 23 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Some of the literature addresses this issue by adding an RP constraint to the typical mechanism design problem (Green and Laffont 1987, Forges 1994, Neeman and Pavlov 2013, Goltsman 2011, Beshkar 2016). While different papers have different definitions, the overall goal of adding the constraint is to guarantee that if a mechanism is RP, then, after the choice of the agent becomes known, the principal does not wish to propose a second alternative mechanism that the agent, at least for some types, prefers over the original one.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Silva

2019

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I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type affects only the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, that can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation‐proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation‐proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Silva

2019

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“…The same cannot be assumed in other contexts, however, for example in a business relation. For a de…nition of renegotiation-proofness in the presence of asymmetric information, see, among others, Dewatripont (1989), Aghion et al (1990), Dewatripont and Maskin (1990), and Neeman and Pavlov (2013).…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We demonstrate that the notion of a "family constitution" (self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family norm) requiring adults to provide attention for elderly parents carries over from a world where sexually indifferentiated individuals reproduce by cell separation, to one where individuals differentiated by sex marry, have children and bargain over the allocation of domestic resources on condition that individual preferences are transmitted from parents to children, and having the same preferences is a criterion for marrying. We also show that policies are generally nonneutral (even if the individuals concerned are altruistically linked to one another) and affect the share of the adult population that are governed by family constitutions. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: D100, I200, I300, J100.

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“…Ex post renegotiation has been studied by Green and Laffont [16], Forges [11], and Neeman and Pavlov [29]. In these contributions the concepts employed are variations on the principle that a mechanism is (ex post) renegotiation-proof if, for any outcome x of the mechanism and any alternative outcome y, the players would not vote unanimously for y in preference to x if a neutral third party were to propose it to them.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation

Evans

Reiche

2015

Journal of Economic Theory

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We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's contract choice, the principal can offer a new menu of contracts in its place. An outcome function can be implemented in this setting if and only if it is optimal for the principal for some belief over agent types which is more pessimistic, in the sense of the likelihood ratio order, than the prior. Furthermore, the outcome function cannot be too sensitive to variations in the agent's type. We show that the direct revelation mechanism which implements such a function when renegotiation can be prevented will also implement it in any equilibrium when it cannot, so the standard contract is robust to renegotiation.

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Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design

Cited by 23 publications

References 32 publications

Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention

Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation

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