2016
DOI: 10.1177/2057047315625076
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Evolving repertoires: Digital media use in contentious politics

Abstract: The spread of the Internet coupled with knowledgeable users has led to the use of digital media as a tool for advocacy and activism. Building on theoretical foundations of eventful histories and digital formations, this article investigates the interrelated nature of contentious politics and digital technologies. Our analysis documents the eventful history of changing digital repertoires of contention in the context of messaging, blogging, and social networking sites in Iran. We argue that investigating single… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(18 citation statements)
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References 43 publications
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“…In contrast, while Twitter offers spontaneous interaction and information sharing, it does not offer a stage for a curated set of performances and stories which that can serve as a focal point and amass support through likes and comments. Facebook features such as groups and events played an important role during election campaigns in 2009 in Iran (Khazraee & Losey, 2016). Such features convinced Iranian authorities to censor Facebook, while Instagram, though it is owned by Facebook, is not blocked in Iran.…”
Section: Discussion and Reflectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In contrast, while Twitter offers spontaneous interaction and information sharing, it does not offer a stage for a curated set of performances and stories which that can serve as a focal point and amass support through likes and comments. Facebook features such as groups and events played an important role during election campaigns in 2009 in Iran (Khazraee & Losey, 2016). Such features convinced Iranian authorities to censor Facebook, while Instagram, though it is owned by Facebook, is not blocked in Iran.…”
Section: Discussion and Reflectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such features convinced Iranian authorities to censor Facebook, while Instagram, though it is owned by Facebook, is not blocked in Iran. Khazraee and Losey (2016) argue that this different treatment of platforms relates to the minimal affordances of Instagram as a digital repertoire for contentious politics.…”
Section: Discussion and Reflectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is closely connected to the concept of surveillance capitalism (Dencik & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017; Zuboff, 2015) which examines the increasing interdependencies of platforms (and their data mining operations) and state-based projects of surveillance and control. These relationships have been examined through case studies examining the Snowden leaks, revealing the capacity of the NSA to access metadata and private communications of citizens via telecommunications providers (Hintz, Dencik, & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017), as well as state use of digital technologies to intervene in activist communications in Iran (Howard and Hussein, 2013;Khazraee & Losey, 2016) and Egypt (Tufecki, 2017;Tufecki & Wilson, 2012) by shutting down mobile networks or using deep packet inspection systems to slow information flows (Howard and Hussein, 2013, p. 2). These states were also said to be involved in paying informants to spread misinformation or biased information on activist websites and social media (Howard and Hussein, 2013, p. 2).…”
Section: State Surveillance Manipulation and Freezing Of Participatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There has also been a return in the scholarship to Morozov's claims that rather than democratizing media and empowering everyday citizens, social media more easily lend themselves to manipulation and repression by authoritarian states, corporate platforms, and socially divisive actors (Morozov, 2011). Much of this literature concentrates on government laws to interdict speech, or blocking and filtering technologies to disrupt digital infrastructure, interrupting vital flows of communication between organizers and protesters (Howard & Hussein, 2013;Khazraee & Losey, 2016;Tufecki, 2017). There is also a growing focus on more subtle techniques adopted by states to manipulate "affective publics" (Papacharissi, 2015(Papacharissi, , 2016, that is, through trolls and misinformation campaigns (Bradshaw & Howard, 2017;Kelly, Truong, Shahbaz, Earp, & White, 2017;Woolley & Howard, 2017), affecting capacities for "informed citizenship" and the functioning of democracy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…During the subsequent year, when there were no calls for street demonstrations, some more individualized forms of offline activities (such as writing political messages on the wall or cash money) and online activities (such as campaigning, blogging, and petitioning) came to the fore (Honari, 2013). Increasing online activities of the IGM coincided with the substantial growth of the practice of state repression on the Internet (Bailey & Labovitz, 2011;Ghobadiha & Clegg, 2015;Khazraee & Losey, 2016). This was followed by the gradual decline of online and offline activities.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%