Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Abstract

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Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture

“…Our results thus address a criticism of the literature on preference evolution, according to which it con ‡ates revealed preferences with preferences that drive choice, see, e.g. Newton (2018).…”

“…1 If preferences are transmitted across generations and if they a¤ect the expected survival and reproduction-the …tness-of their bearer: which preferences are likely to be favored by evolution and which preferences are likely to disappear? Analysis of the long-term evolution of preference distributions can help understand the proximate drivers and motivation of human behavior in social and economic interactions (Hirshleifer, 1977, Bergstrom, 1996, Binmore 1998, Robson, 2001, Newton, 2018, Alger and Weibull, 2019. Here we build on previous work on strategy evolution in structured populations (Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull, 2015) by studying preference evolution in such populations.…”

Evolution of Cooperation for Multiple Mutant Configurations on All Regular Graphs with N ≤ 14 Players

“…Describing conditions for the emergence of cooperation in structured populations is a fundamental problem in evolutionary game theory [4,19,20,35]. In structured populations the network describing which players interact with each other may be crucial for the fixation of a strategy.…”

The Evolution of Collective Choice Under Majority Rule

“…2 For applications of stochastic evolutionary game theory in cooperative settings, see Agastya (1999), Jackson and Watts (2002), Arnold and Schwalbe (2002), Klaus et al (2010), Newton (2012), Sawa (2014), Newton and Sawa (2015), Nax and Pradelski (2015), Boncinelli and Pin (2018), and Bilancini et al (2019). See also Section 2 of Newton (2018). that stochastic evolutionary theory mitigates the indeterminacy problem of majority voting for multidimensional policy spaces.…”