Evolutionary game of environmental investment under national environmental regulation in China

Abstract

With the rapid development of social economy, the deterioration of environment has become more and more serious, it is urgent to find a balance between economic development and environmental protection. Therefore, enterprises are appealed to invest in environmental protection and local municipalities are appealed to supervise the environmental behaviors of enterprises, while central government plays a role of regulation. In order to study the preconditions for a better environmental strategy combination of local municipalities and enterprises, an evolutionary game theory was first constructed in this paper, then the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of local municipalities and enterprises under different scenarios was examined, and finally a simulation was used to test the results of the analysis. The results indicate that central government's regulation has influence on the strategies chosen by local municipalities and enterprises, the larger the degree of central government's incentives are, the more possible local municipalities and enterprises would choose environment-friendly strategies;and the intensity of central government's regulation, the cost and benefits of local municipalities' supervision, and the cost and benefits of enterprises' environmental investment are the key influence factors.

Profit distribution and stability analysis of joint distribution alliance based on tripartite evolutionary game theory under the background of green and low carbon

“…Besides, owing to strong shocks to society and the economy from environmental problems, green and low-carbon development patterns have gradually attracted more attention from all over the world (Wu B et al 2017). Many scholars studied the strategic game relationships between the government and various market participants under the background of green and low carbon (Zhao R et al 2016;Fan RG et al 2017;Wu B et al 2017;Zhang LP et al 2019;Sun T and Feng Q 2021). At this time, the research field is no longer limited to logistics, but also covers electric vehicles (Hirte G and Tscharaktschiew S 2013;Liu C et al 2017;Zhou X et al 2019;Du ZL et al 2019), green supply chain (Sheu JB and Chen YM 2012;Hafezalkotob A et al 2016;Madani SR and Rasti-Barzoki M 2017;Zu YF et al 2018;Mahmoudi R and Rasti-Barzoki M 2018;Yuan BY et al 2018;Hafezalkotob A 2018;Shi YY et al 2020;Long QQ et al 2021), e-waste (Peng BH et al 2019) and so on.…”

Environmental Regulation, Environmental Decentralization, and Enterprise Environmental Protection Investment: Evidence From China

“…In order to maintain the relationship with the government and get the support of the government, enterprises take practical actions to meet the expectations and requirements of the government ( 8 ). There is no doubt that environmental regulation (Reg), as an environmental management system, has an important impact on standardizing the environmental behavior of enterprises ( 9 ) and guides the investment decision-making direction of enterprises to a certain extent.…”

What Is the Mechanism of Government Green Development Behavior Considering Multi-Agent Interaction? A Meta-Analysis

“…According to neo-institutional theory, enterprises are subject to both normative and coercive institutional pressures from the government. For normative institutional pressure, previous scholars have mainly focused on the enterprise perspective and emphasized the positive effects of government green development behaviors (e.g., government environmental regulation) on enterprise economic behavior [ 63 ], enterprise environmental behavior [ 64 ], and enterprise social behavior [ 65 ]. This shows that the above studies support the results of this study.…”