Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Airlines’ Behavioral Strategies in China under Carbon Trading

Abstract

The reduction of carbon emissions by airlines has become a crucial objective in achieving carbon neutrality. However, due to the existing benefits game between airlines and local governments, reducing carbon emissions in the air transport industry is a complex process. Previous research on reducing carbon emissions in the Chinese air transport industry has been divided on which approach to take. This study investigates the potential contribution of a carbon trading mechanism towards carbon emission reduction. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is employed to analyze the complex interactions between local governments and airlines, with the public will being introduced as a constraint in the proposed model. Secondly, the impact of the carbon trading mechanism on the dynamic evolution process and stakeholders is analyzed. Furthermore, the stability of the proposed evolutionary game model is verified through empirical analysis. The results show that the carbon trading mechanism plays a significant positive role in promoting both parties’ objectives, indicating that it is a feasible method for reducing emissions in China’s air transport industry.