Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Government and Residents in Municipal Household Waste Separation

Abstract

Municipal household waste (MHW) separation is a fundamental way to achieve waste reduction and a recycling economy. This study takes the positions of government and residents in MHW separation as the research object, and aims to explore the change process and influencing factors of their decision-making behavior, which is of great significance to attract residents to participate in MHW separation and establish an effective MHW separation mechanism to solve MHW pollution. This paper firstly establishes an evolutionary game model between government and residents in MHW separation; secondly, the payoff matrix of the system is determined, and the replication dynamic equations under different constraints are calculated to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the system, and the stability conditions are analyzed; Finally, through numerical simulation, the decision-making behavior of MHW separation and its influencing factors are studied, and the rationality of the model is verified. The results show that: (1) In the process of MHW separation, residents often choose not to separate without government regulation; (2) Environmental fee rates and government effort have great impacts on residents’ decision-making behavior; (3) The increase of penalty intensity can significantly drive residents to separate MHW; (4) The sensitivity of residents’ behavior decision to subsidy coefficient is the lowest among all the variables, and the incentive effect of increasing subsidy coefficient is not obvious. The research results can not only provide theoretical guidance for policy makers to develop waste management policies, but also provide valuable insights for local communities to guide residents’ MHW separation behavior.

The Supervision Mechanism of Residents’ Waste Separation Behavior: Analysis Using a Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

“…The government is less sensitive to the penalty for residents. This finding agrees with the result of Wu et al [ 17 ] and is confirmed in reality. Penalty measures have been promoted in some cities where waste separation is mandatory, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, and fines for residents refusing to separate waste vary.…”

“…Zhang [ 57 ] compared the static and dynamic penalty mechanisms for waste separation to analyze the behavioral strategies of the public and the government. Wu et al [ 17 ] established the evolutionary game model involving the government and residents in municipal household waste separation. Based on the prospect theory and evolutionary game, Zhang et al [ 58 ] investigated the behavior change process of government and residents to understand how to optimize the benefits of waste separation for stakeholders.…”

“…Although some studies have investigated solid waste management using evolutionary games, research on the supervision mechanism of waste separation is rare, especially in the context of China's mandatory waste separation policy. There may be a direct link between the strength of regulation and the effectiveness of the mandatory policy, as most residents are less likely to participate in waste separation without supervision [ 16 , 17 ]. The evolutionary game model can explain the dynamic interactions of stakeholders under the mandatory policy and try to solve the dilemma of waste separation governance.…”

Influencing Factors on the Household-Waste-Classification Behavior of Urban Residents: A Case Study in Shanghai

“…Lucia et al [ 12 ], Guo et al [ 13 ], Miafodzyeva et al [ 14 ], Convery et al [ 15 ] and Wu [ 16 ] claimed that residents’ household waste classification will be significantly affected by reward and punishment policies, and positive economic incentives are more easily accepted by residents. Wadehra et al [ 17 ] confirmed in the investigation of waste classification in India that the quality of the reward and punishment mechanism is closely related to the implementation effect of the classification policy, and a high-quality reward and punishment mechanism can strengthen the residents’ willingness to classify garbage and promote the residents to implement the behavior of waste classification.…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Residents’ Participation in Waste Separation Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

“…Waste separation (garbage classification) is an upgrade to the traditional waste disposal method and a scientific management method to dispose of urban waste efficiently. “In 2017, the General Office of the State Council of China released the Implementation Plan of Domestic Waste Separation, and 46 cities were identified as pilot cities; from 2019, cities across the country began to fully implement waste-separation policy; by the end of 2025, all cities will have established waste-separation systems” [ 4 ].…”