2021
DOI: 10.3390/risks9120220
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Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Partners’ Behavior in the Rural E-Payment Market of China

Abstract: The rural e-payment market in China is becoming one of the important topics in the research field because of its contribution to the efficiency of fund flows in the economy. Further development of the rural e-payment market mainly depends on its partners’ acceptance. In March 2020, 776.08 million people were using mobile payments in China. After the COVID-19 pandemic in China, the Payment and Clearing Association of China launched an action to encourage citizens to use mobile payments. In this article evolutio… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Its score value is higher than that of a nonexistent edge randomly selected. Its calculation formula is shown in (4). Where n denotes the number of extraction experiments, 𝑛 ′ indicates that the fraction of the test set is bigger than the fraction of non-existent edges, and 𝑛 ′′ indicates that the fraction of the test set is equal to the fraction of nonexistent edges.…”
Section: Evaluation Metricmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Its score value is higher than that of a nonexistent edge randomly selected. Its calculation formula is shown in (4). Where n denotes the number of extraction experiments, 𝑛 ′ indicates that the fraction of the test set is bigger than the fraction of non-existent edges, and 𝑛 ′′ indicates that the fraction of the test set is equal to the fraction of nonexistent edges.…”
Section: Evaluation Metricmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Megamerger [3] and partnership [4] are common theories in management. They are essential in inter-firm cooperation [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Security (Lin & Nguyen, 2011), usability (Hsieh et al, 2013;Schuh & Stavins, 2016), ease of use (Jose Liebana-Cabanillas et al, 2014), and the perceived risk of using e-payment methods are crucial for the adoption of immaterial monetary transactions (Ho et al, 2020). Enhancing e-payments is advantageous for economic development, resulting in a favorable increase in public revenues (Wisniewski et al, 2020). In addition, the widespread use of mobile phones has the effect of increasing the perceived utility of online mobile e-payments among users (Garrett et al, 2014;Bailey et al, 2022).…”
Section: E-payment Behavior and Shadow Economymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Evolutionary game theory assumes that game plays have the characteristics of finite rationality, and game subjects repeatedly play dynamic and repetitive games until they find the optimal stable strategy equilibrium point in the game system [ 18 , 19 ]. Most researchers have used two-party or three-party game players, of which two-party game players consist mainly of government and enterprises [ 20 ], financial institutions and users [ 21 ], and enterprises and the public [ 22 ]. For example, Zhang et al [ 23 ] constructed an evolutionary game framework for supply chain enterprises and analyzed the evolution path of enterprises’ green behavior strategies, indicating that enterprises need to reduce green investment costs and participate in collaborative management.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%