Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System

Zhang, Ming; Zhu, Jianjun; Kumaraswamy, Ponnambalam; Wang, Hehua

doi:10.3390/math7070588

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In another research on collaboration and cooperation, Feng et al [11] used the evolutionary game to analyze the mechanism between prefabricated component producers under punishment and incentive conditions. When manufacturers and suppliers try to solve problems in a complex collaborative system, the evolutionary game theory helps analyze how the problem scale and handling mechanism impact the decision-making process [12].…”

Section: An Evolutionary Game Model For the Collaborative Innovation By Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

Xie

Huai-ying

2021

Journal of Mathematics

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Collaborative innovation between companies is critical for increasing supply chain value. However, as a dynamic game process, the collaboration between manufacturer, provider, and seller in the supply chain is influenced by a range of elements. This paper is set out to investigate the collaborative innovation strategy adopted by manufacturer, supplier, and distributor (the “three players”). To meet this end, an analytical framework was built to study the evolutionary game of collaborative innovation in supply chain enterprises. Based on the analysis, this research further studied the dynamic evolutionary mechanism and influencing elements through four different simulation cases. The research showed the following. (1) When the three players have equal innovative capability, they are more willing to contribute to innovation if the projected revenue is higher reflecting an increasing coefficient of collaborative innovation gains. As a result, the three players are more likely to agree on their cooperation approach. (2) When the three players have different independent and innovative capabilities, they are more willing to innovate if the collaborative innovation gain coefficient increases, but supply chain players with stronger capability are more active to innovate than their peers. In other words, strong innovators attach particular attention to innovation. (3) When any collaborative innovation could generate profits for all players in the supply chain, the player who enjoys the benefit but lacks innovative capability will be unwilling to cooperate with others if additional gains rise. Thus, better maintenance of the stability of the collaborative innovation system requires a strictly implemented coordination mechanism.

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Section: An Evolutionary Game Model For the Collaborative Innovation By Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

Xie

Huai-ying

2021

Journal of Mathematics

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“…Li et al further studied ecological compensation in the Taihu Basin of China [40]. Evolutionary game theory also provides a practicable research tool for the study of patterns of cooperation among manufacturers and suppliers in supply chain management [41,42]. For PPP projects, during their long life-cycle, the government and private sector cooperate around a unified project goal.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

Nie

Feng

Zhao

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

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“…Wu et al [10] objectively studied and analyzed how the collaborative relationship between suppliers affects the supply chain's operation. Zhang et al [11] proposed a new primary manufacturer supplier collaboration model based on evolutionary game theory and pointed out that manufacturers should fully share information and effectively communicate with suppliers. Compared with a collaborative supply chain, a traditional supply chain can improve the collaborative profit of the supply chain, enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises, and be more robust to the change of lead time [12].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Supplier Collaboration of Daily Consumer Goods under Uncertainty of Supply and Demand

et al. 2021

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This paper establishes the decentralized decision-making model of consumer goods, the active collaboration model of consumer goods suppliers, and the decentralized decision-making model of customized consumer goods. Through formula derivation and simulation, the benefit and influence differences of the three modes are compared. This paper studies the influence of supplier’s active collaboration on the supply and demand instability of consumer goods and discusses the ideal value of supply chain inventory control. In China’s modern circular economy, the inventory control of the consumer goods supply chain is unscientific and nonstandard. We discuss a new inventory control method and study the ideal value of supply chain inventory control. It helps reduce the inventory shortage loss caused by the uncertainty of daily consumer goods, improve the efficiency of the supply chain, enhance the liquidity of supply chain inventory to achieve the purpose of increasing economic value. It has reference value for the inventory control of consumer goods in other countries and regions. The results show that under certain conditions, the horizontal collaboration between suppliers can improve the completeness of consumer goods. The collaboration between suppliers can reduce the hidden dangers caused by the uncertainty of supply and demand and significantly reduce the total inventory cost of manufacturers and improve profits.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System

Cited by 3 publications

References 45 publications

Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

Simulation Study on the Evolutionary Game Mechanism of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain Enterprises and Its Influencing Elements

The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

Research on Supplier Collaboration of Daily Consumer Goods under Uncertainty of Supply and Demand

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