Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy-Saving Renovations of Existing Rural Residential Buildings from the Perspective of Stakeholders

Abstract

To promote the orderly development of energy-saving renovations of existing rural residential buildings, it is necessary to coordinate the interests of various stakeholders. This study selects three key stakeholders—the government, energy-saving service enterprises and rural residents—as the research subjects and analyzes their interests and rights. In the meantime, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the evolutionary rules and evolutionary stable strategies of tripartite behaviors, on the basis of which the influencing factors are analyzed. The research results show that: (1) as the supervisor and advocate of energy-saving renovations in existing rural residential buildings, the government, by adopting subsidies and fines, effectively fosters enthusiasm about energy-saving service enterprises among rural residents, encouraging them to participate in energy-saving renovations of existing rural residential buildings; (2) when the income of energy-saving renovations exceeds their cost, changes in the initial willingness ratio of the stakeholders, the government subsidies and fines only affect the evolution of the system so that it reaches a balanced and stable state, without changing the three parties’ behavioral strategy choices in the game; (3) when the income from energy-saving renovations is lower than the cost, the behavioral strategies of the three parties in the game are all uncooperative; (4) key factors affecting tripartite cooperation in the game are as follows: government subsidies and fines, the overall interests of society, government supervision costs, loss of corporate image, standardization of the skills and services provided by enterprises, and willingness of rural residents to participate in the transformation.

Green Retrofitting Simulation for Sustainable Commercial Buildings in China Using a Proposed Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game

“…When the probability of multiple agents approaches one, the supportive behavior of all agents is impossible. Huang and Lin [66] reflect that the result of stable strategies is all based on economic consideration. This study reveals that the occupant groups exhibit less awareness and motivation, which is similar to the findings of a previous study on rural individuals in [66], further confirming our point that more friendly and economic benefits should be given to occupants.…”

“…Broadly speaking, economic benefit contributes to the core motivation of green retrofitting; thus, ensuring its cost-effectiveness using numerical and quantitative methods is significant. Tremendous efforts have been devoted to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of green retrofitting with a focus on the optimization of rating systems [13,14,16,18,21,[56][57][58][59], decision-making methods [10,12,[60][61][62], single-technique energy-saving potentials [41,[63][64][65][66][67][68][69], and policy barrier commendations [39,45,53,55,59,62,[70][71][72] (Figure 2). A static agent focuses on one enterprise itself, but not the entire lateral industry, indicating that it is essential to investigate the promotion level of all enterprises in the developer group or enterprise group.…”

Sustainable-Driven Renovation of Existing Residential Buildings in China: A Systematic Exploration Based on Review and Solution Approaches

“…To overcome the financing difficulties in the energy efficiency renovation of existing residential buildings in China, three key stakeholders, namely the government, energy service companies, and residents, were selected for study [114]. By improving the costbenefit analysis method [115], different financing models were proposed, including the local government-led, property company-led, energy service, and heating supply companyled models.…”

Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

“…Then it proposes countermeasures to promote the development of the building energy retrofit market in four aspects: building a credit system, implementing guidance mechanisms, optimizing revenue distribution, and promoting technological innovation. Huang et al [18] constructed an evolutionary game model for rural residential energy efficiency retrofitting based on government, ESCOs, and rural residents. On this basis, they analyzed the factors influencing their behavior.…”

“…As a policy maker and for motivation, the government provides incentive policies such as building planning, land transfer, infrastructure support construction, and tax incentives to mobilize each participating subject to carry out LRRB. As the regulator and coordinator of the LRRB market, the government adopts tax penalties for subjects who do not meet the standards of the LRRB market and governs market failures [18]. The clear guidance of the government leads to enhanced government credibility and social benefits, which generates more potential benefits for the government [31].…”