Evolutionary Game Analysis for Key Participants’ Behavior in Digital Transformation of the Chinese Construction Industry

Zhang, Chaoyong; Lv, Lelin; Wang, Zhuofu

doi:10.3390/buildings13040922

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Second, increasing the benefit of digital transformation and reducing the cost of digital transformation can increase the probability of digital transformation of energy enterprises, and increasing the collaborative coefficient of digital transformation can promote the possibility of digital transformation of energy enterprises. Again, when the basic benefits of energy enterprises and their transformation costs reach a certain level, increasing the government's penalty will have a positive externality on the digital transformation of energy enterprises [51]. Finally, when the public benefit gained by the government through incentivizing the digital transformation of energy enterprises is greater than the cost incurred by the government for making corresponding incentive policies, the government incentive strategy will be significantly related to the willingness of energy enterprises to transform; and the greater the penalty or the smaller the subsidy, the greater the willingness of the government incentive.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Analysis on Energy Enterprises’ Digital Transformation—Strategic Simulation for Guiding Role, Leading Role and Following Role

Liu

2023

Sustainability

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The aim of this study is to explore the dynamics and impediments in exploring the digital transformation process of energy enterprises, considering industry competition and government involvement. Compared with other industries, energy enterprises have both economic tasks and social responsibilities at the same time, while their business modes have certain “inertia”. Therefore, the process of their digital transformation cannot avoid the balance of interests between the different agents. From the perspective of competition and cooperation in the sector, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government and energy enterprises, analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of the game system, and simulates different initial intentions and key parameters for all roles. The results show that in the process of digital transformation, the symbiotic relationship between energy enterprises and the cooperative relationship between enterprises and government can be embodied, and the effective game process has sufficient economic guidance. The government plays the guiding role in the digital transformation of energy enterprises, and its initial intention has a significantly stronger impact than the energy enterprise’s intentions. The effective strategy reflects the principle of “waiting for an opportunity to act, giving priority to efficiency, and giving consideration to justice”. Under the given policy environment, energy enterprises with comparative advantages in terms of transformation costs, direct benefits and synergy will become the leading role that is more sensitive to the opportunities of digital transformation, and the following energy enterprise will adjust its own strategies in time according to the effect of the leading role’s digital transformation so as to achieve the stability of the system. Accordingly, this study can provide reference support for energy enterprises to develop digital transformation strategies and for governments to formulate reasonable and effective policies.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Analysis on Energy Enterprises’ Digital Transformation—Strategic Simulation for Guiding Role, Leading Role and Following Role

Liu

2023

Sustainability

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“…Given the limited rationality of human beings, finding the optimal equilibrium in the initial game is highly improbable. However, in subsequent games, each player improves their strategy through imitation and learning, aiming to identify the evolutionarily stable strategy [43]. Currently, an increasing number of scholars employ evolutionary game theory to analyze various group behaviors in society.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory

Zhang

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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In today’s world, the contradiction between water supply and demand is becoming increasingly pronounced, with a particular emphasis on the severe shortage of water for agricultural purposes. As a result, it has become imperative to promote the comprehensive reform of agricultural water pricing and increase water conservation awareness among water users. However, during the actual promotion process, the conflicting interests among stakeholders often create a behavioral game that seriously hinders the effective implementation of the agricultural water price reform. Therefore, it is crucial to address this conflict of interest and find ways to overcome it in order to ensure the successful implementation of the agricultural water pricing reform. In order to explore the dynamic evolution process of the behavior and decision making of the stakeholders in the comprehensive agricultural water price reform and the influencing factors and to propose relevant strategies to effectively promote the reform. This article constructs a three-party game model based on MA-PT theory with the government, farmers, and water supply units as the main subjects, solves the equation with the perceived benefit matrix instead of the traditional benefit matrix, and calculates the objective conditions for reaching the steady state. The simulation results show that the behavioral decision of the game subject to participate in the reform will be influenced by their perception of gains and losses, and there is a mutual influence between the three strategic choices. Therefore, the reform of agricultural water prices should consider the affordability of farmers and water supply units. The government appropriately adopts a reward system to encourage farmers and water supply units to actively participate in the reform to play a positive role and appropriate penalties for promoting the reform, the early realization of the reform goals, and the development of water-saving agriculture.

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“…In recent years, with the expansion of the application field of evolutionary game theory, some scholars have studied the problems of companies digital transformation based on evolutionary game theory. Zhang et al (2023) argued that the problem of low digitization in China's construction industry is relatively prominent, constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, service providers, and construction companies, explored the influencing factors of the digital transformation of construction companies. Cloud-native is an innovative technology necessary for realizing companies digital transformation, Zhang et al (2022) combined with evolutionary game theory to construct the game relationship between cloud providers and companies in cloud-native selection, which provides a reference for various stakeholders to promote the landing of cloud-native and companies digital transformation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does government policy matter in the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives?—A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Zheng,

Mei,

Chen

2024

Front. Sustain. Food Syst.

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Farmers’ cooperatives, as one of the new types of agricultural businesses, are an effective carrier for the digital transformation of agriculture, yet existing studies have paid less attention to how farmers’ cooperatives realize digital transformation. As agricultural economic organizations embedded in social networks, the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives requires the joint efforts of governments and companies. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, digital technology companies and farmers’ cooperatives, and simulates and analyzes the behavioral decisions of different participants in the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives from the perspective of government policy. The results show: Medium government subsidies can effectively promote the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives, and strong subsidy policies increase the government’s financial burden, which is not conducive to policy sustainability. Strong government regulation facilitates digital technology companies to actively provide high-quality services for the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives, but government regulation does not have a significant impact on the strategic choices of the government and farmers’ cooperatives. When farmer cooperatives and digital technology companies are in a medium or high level of cooperative trust or when the number of labors saved by digital transformation reaches a certain level, farmers’ cooperatives opt for digital transformation even if the government withdraws from policy intervention.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis for Key Participants’ Behavior in Digital Transformation of the Chinese Construction Industry

Cited by 7 publications

References 37 publications

Game Analysis on Energy Enterprises’ Digital Transformation—Strategic Simulation for Guiding Role, Leading Role and Following Role

Game Analysis on Energy Enterprises’ Digital Transformation—Strategic Simulation for Guiding Role, Leading Role and Following Role

Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory

Does government policy matter in the digital transformation of farmers’ cooperatives?—A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

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