Evolutionary game analysis between employees and employers about working overtime from the perspective of information asymmetry

Abstract

Background Overtime is an international phenomenon, especially in some Chinese Internet technology companies, the 996 work regime is a common corporate atmosphere. This paper holds that overtime work is the result of a long-term dynamic game between employees and employers. In such a dynamic evolution process, employers and employees both cooperate and conflict, they will choose a strategy conducive to their own development through long-term learning and improvement. Methods Based on the evolutionary game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper constructs a $$2\times 2$$ 2 × 2 evolutionary game matrix. The strategies of employees can be divided into voluntary overtime and involuntary overtime, while the strategies of employers can be divided into providing overtime pay and not providing overtime pay. The stability of the system is related to four parameters: resource consumption, information asymmetry coefficient, trust coefficient, and moral hazard coefficient. Results Through an in-depth study of the model and data simulation, the system has five equilibrium points, an ESS point, and a saddle point in any case. Accordingly, we put forward two theorems and three propositions, which are verified not only theoretically but also by data simulation. Besides, the strategies of the employees and the employers will evolve from the initial state to (Involuntarily, Not pay) or (Voluntarily, Pay) under different situations. This is closely related to the initial parameters of the evolutionary game model and the payment matrix. Conclusions By summarizing the influence of each parameter on the evolutionary path, we believe that fairness and information equivalence between employees and employers can effectively promote both parties to reach the Pareto optimal state. In other words, employees and employers need to communicate and share information promptly to ensure the unity of information acquired by each other and achieve a win–win situation. This paper contributes to providing theoretical guidance and practical enlightenment for organizations to manage employees' overtime behavior scientifically and improve their work psychology reasonably.

Stakeholder Perspectives on Overtime Culture

“…Research on long working hours in China is limited. However, working hours in China are among the longest in the world and overtime, overtime work and even "overwork" are common among the Chinese [24] . Therefore, further attention needs to be paid to the adverse effects of long working hours in China.…”

“…Overtime is an international phenomenon, especially in some Chinese internet technology companies where a 996 (9 am-9 pm, 6 days a week) working system is a common corporate atmosphere [24]. The National Bureau of Statistics of China revealed in April 2021 that the average working week for employees in Chinese companies was 46.4 hours, 2.4 hours more than the legal maximum working week.…”

Research on the Regulation of Algorithmic Price Discrimination Behaviour of E-Commerce Platform Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

“…Evolutionary games believe that the subject of the game is limited and rational and can effectively analyse the influencing factors in the decision-making process, continuously learn and improve the game strategy [19,20], and finally approach the equilibrium state [21]. They have been widely used in environmental protection [22,23], finance [24,25], medicine [26,27], management [28,29] and other fields. Evolutionary games are consistent with the actual process of behaviour regulation [30][31][32].…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Local Government and Enterprises on Bridge Employment from the Perspective of Dynamic Incentive and Punishment

“…Krapohl et al [53] analyzed the stability of international trade cooperation by using evolutionary game theory. Dong and Yan [54] constructed an evolutionary game matrix about working overtime from the perspective of information asymmetry.…”