2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2020.124665
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Evolutionary accumulated temptation game on small world networks

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Cited by 16 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Previous studies have confirmed that reciprocity is required for sustained cooperative behavior among both humans and animals [43][44][45][46] . The results of our study are consistent with these findings as we demonstrated that first, experiencing non-reciprocity to cooperative behavior (viz., having a sucker experience in the PDG) strongly decreased the likelihood of repeated cooperation; and second, reciprocity to cooperation (i.e., a reward outcome) enhanced the probability in the subsequent rounds.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 77%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Previous studies have confirmed that reciprocity is required for sustained cooperative behavior among both humans and animals [43][44][45][46] . The results of our study are consistent with these findings as we demonstrated that first, experiencing non-reciprocity to cooperative behavior (viz., having a sucker experience in the PDG) strongly decreased the likelihood of repeated cooperation; and second, reciprocity to cooperation (i.e., a reward outcome) enhanced the probability in the subsequent rounds.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…In this respect, it is important to stress that we used an iterated stranger design, which implies that each player only interacts once with each other player in the group without knowing whether they cooperated in the previous rounds playing with others. Contrary to the case of repeatedly interacting with the same player, no strategy based on direct reciprocity (e.g., tit-fortat strategy) 44 can be reasonably applied. Also indirect-reciprocity strategies, where information about previous interactions with other persons can be taken into account during the current interaction, or the behavior in the current interaction may be considered in future interactions (e.g., based on reputation) 47 , are ruled out.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous studies have confirmed that reciprocity is required for sustained cooperative behavior among both humans and animals [43][44][45][46] . The results of our study are consistent with these findings as we demonstrated that first, experiencing non-reciprocity to cooperative behavior (viz., having a sucker experience in the PDG) strongly www.nature.com/scientificreports/ decreased the likelihood of repeated cooperation; and second, reciprocity to cooperation (i.e., a reward outcome) enhanced the probability in the subsequent rounds.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 77%
“…In this respect, it is important to stress that we used an iterated stranger design, which implies that each player only interacts once with each other player in the group without knowing whether they cooperated in the previous rounds playing with others. Contrary to the case of repeatedly interacting with the same player, no strategy based on direct reciprocity (e.g., tit-for-tat strategy) 44 can be reasonably applied. Also indirect-reciprocity strategies, where information about previous interactions with other persons can be taken into account during the current interaction, or the behavior in the current interaction may be considered in future interactions (e.g., based on reputation) 47 , are ruled out.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Without exaggeration, hundreds of research papers were published by scientists with biology, economics, applied mathematics, or statistical physics background, in which they proposed different microscopic models to increase the general willingness of actors to cooperate with their partners [8,9,10,11,12]. In some cases the desired evolutionary outcome is expected, for example when defection is punished or cooperation is awarded by individuals or by a governing institution [13,14,15,16,17,18,19].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%