Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

Koçkesen, Levent; Ok, Efe A.; Sethi, Rajiv

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0750

Cited by 67 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Feelings of distance from family and heritage can also arise as consequences of preference change. As the daughter of an 13 See, for example, Güth and Yaari (1992), Güth (1995), Huck and Oechssler (1999), Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000), Ely and Yılankaya (2001), Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), Sandholm (2001) and Sethi and Somanathan (2001). 14 Indeed, Festinger's (1957) dissonance theory is explicit in linking preference change to psychic discomfort.…”

Section: Discontents Of Cultural Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Integration and Its Discontents

Kuran

Sandholm

2002

SSRN Journal

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A community's culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviors of its members. Contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms: behavioral adaptations driven by payoffs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self-persuasion. This paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviors vary continuously. It identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross-cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization. The analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities, thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism. Yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends, it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviors.-1-

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Section: Discontents Of Cultural Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Integration and Its Discontents

Kuran

Sandholm

2002

SSRN Journal

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“…Huck and Oechssler (1999), for example, explore spiteful preferences in a mini-version of the ultimatum game. Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000a) and Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000b) analyze interdependent preferences in symmetric aggregative games and certain classes of symmetric supermodular and submodular games, respectively. Sethi and Somanathan (2001) consider reciprocal preferences in aggregative games.…”

Section: Indirect Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reciprocity—An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Berninghaus

Korth²,

Napel

2009

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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This paper investigates strategic interaction between rational agents whose preferences evolve over time. Players face a pecuniary 'game of life' comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Utility may but need not be attached to the reciprocation of fair and unfair play by the opponent and equitable payoff distributions as proposed by Falk and Fischbacher (2001). Evolutionary fitness is determined solely by material successregardless of the motives for its achievement. Agents cannot explicitly condition the social component of their preferences on whether they face the ultimatum or dictator game.Under these conditions, agents develop a strong preference for reciprocation but little interest in an equitable distribution as such. This corresponds to equitable ultimatum offers but full surplus appropriation by dictators. Adding an exogenous constraint on the possible divergence between preference for reciprocation and for an equitable distribution either makes ultimatum divisions asymmetric or dictators become generous depending on the relative frequency of ultimatum and dictator interaction.

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“…Güth and Napel (2006) study preference evolution when players use the same preferences in both ultimatum and dictator games. Koçkcesen and Ok (2000) investigate survival of more general interdependent preferences in aggregative games. Friedman and Singh (2009) shows that vengefulness may survive if observation has some degree of informativeness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

Heller

Mohlin

2014

SSRN Journal

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We develop a framework in which individuals'preferences co-evolve with their abilities to deceive others regarding their preferences and intentions. We show that a pure outcome is stable, essentially if and only if it is an e¢ cient Nash equilibrium.All individuals have the same deception ability in such a stable state. In contrast, there are non-pure outcomes in which non-Nash outcomes are played, and di¤erent deception abilities co-exist. We extend our model to study preferences that depend also on the opponent's type.

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Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

Cited by 67 publications

References 13 publications

Cultural Integration and Its Discontents

Cultural Integration and Its Discontents

Reciprocity—An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

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