2000
DOI: 10.1162/089976600300014700
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Evolution of Cooperative Problem Solving in an Artificial Economy

Abstract: We address the problem of how to reinforce learning in ultracomplex environments, with huge state-spaces, where one must learn to exploit a compact structure of the problem domain. The approach we propose is to simulate the evolution of an artificial economy of computer programs. The economy is constructed based on two simple principles so as to assign credit to the individual programs for collaborating on problem solutions. We find empirically that starting from programs that are random computer code, we can … Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…That is, the learning of individual self-interested agents and the learning of cooperation among these self-interested agents are simultaneous and thus interacting. This model extends existing work, in that it is not limited to bidding alone, for example, not just bidding alone for forming coalitions (as in Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) or bidding alone as the sole means for learning (as in Baum and Durdanovic 2000). Neither is it a model of pure reinforcement learning, without explicit interaction among agents (such as Shoham and Tennenholtz 1994, Hu and Wellman 1998, Littman 2001.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 76%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…That is, the learning of individual self-interested agents and the learning of cooperation among these self-interested agents are simultaneous and thus interacting. This model extends existing work, in that it is not limited to bidding alone, for example, not just bidding alone for forming coalitions (as in Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994) or bidding alone as the sole means for learning (as in Baum and Durdanovic 2000). Neither is it a model of pure reinforcement learning, without explicit interaction among agents (such as Shoham and Tennenholtz 1994, Hu and Wellman 1998, Littman 2001.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…This value is given to the Q module so that it can take this payoff into account when deciding on its course of action (e.g., whether to reach one giving-up point or another). 4 Therefore, summarizing the above two learning rules, a Q value of an agent (for a particular state-action pair) is the expected (discounted) total reinforcement that the agent will receive from that point on. The Q module of an agent then decides the actions of the agent based on maximizing the expected (discounted) total reinforcement that the agent will receive.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus in his model each model has an implicit domain, in that it is only applies when it out-bids other models in order to be applied (Baum and Durdanovic, 2000b). In the most recent version of his algorithm (called Hayek 4) he also introduces explicit conditions of application as each model is a Post production rule (Baum and Durdanovic, 2000a).…”
Section: Evolutionary Computationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An example of this is the Artificial Economy model [7] based on an economic paradigm, which acts as an evolutionary rule-based system for sequential decision tasks. Comparisons are made between the economic system and early classifiers, however it was developed separately from the improved classifier systems ZCS and XCS.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%