Evolution of cooperation in well-mixed N-person snowdrift games

Chan, Chun-Him; Yin, Haiping; Hui, P. M.; Zheng, Dafang

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2008.01.035

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Essentially, however, all mentioned social dilemmas can consider either pairwise or group interactions, as was suggested in Refs. [3,4]. Indeed, it is expected that the possibility of multi-player interactions can bring about phenomena that cannot be observed in case of pairwise interactions, especially when the underlying topology of players is structured rather than well-mixed [5,6].…”

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confidence: 99%

Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

2010

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We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i.e. their critical mass, exceeds a threshold value. Considering structured populations, we show that a moderate fraction of cooperators can prevail even at very low multiplication factors if the critical mass is minimal. For larger multiplication factors, however, the level of cooperation is highest at an intermediate value of the critical mass. The latter is robust to variations of the group size and the interaction network topology. Applying the optimal critical mass threshold, we show that the fraction of cooperators in public goods games is significantly larger than in the traditional linear model, where the produced public good is proportional to the fraction of cooperators within the group.

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confidence: 99%

Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

2010

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“…We also derive the condition for the existence of an AllC state. In contrast, an AllC state is missing for all non-vanishing values of c/b in NESG [29,30]. Results are summarized in Section 4.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Following the replicator dynamics [10] for the evolutionary process, the steady state and time evolution of the cooperative behavior in a well-mixed population as a function of the ratio c/b and group size N were studied analytically and numerically [29,30]. The model has also been extended to agents connected via a scale-free complex network [31].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The model has also been extended to agents connected via a scale-free complex network [31]. Real world examples of the N-person SG include [29,30]: (i) The maintenance of the tidiness of a common area in a dormitory where the total cleaning task requires a labor of cost c and a tidy environment brings a comfortable sense to everybody and thus everyone is benefited by b. (ii) The division of labor in a group project.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Enhanced cooperation and harmonious population in an evolutionary N-person snowdrift game

Cai

Zheng

et al. 2010

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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“…Both gain the reward R (punishment P) for mutual cooperation (defection). If however, one defector meets a cooperator, the former gets the temptation T and the latter is left with the sucker's payoff S. The payoffs satisfy the ranking T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S, from which it is clear that defection is the best (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) irrespective of the fact that mutual cooperation can bring higher collective benefit [4][5][6]. On the other hand, the snowdrift game, as an alternative of the prisoner's game, takes places if there is a slight change of payoff ranking T > R > S > P, where individual's best strategy depends on his opponent's action.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%