Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods

Salahshour, Mohammad

doi:10.1038/s42003-021-02865-w

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 73 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…The key to the question is that entering the cooperative PGG in the second round is costly, while entering the defective PGG is costless. As it has been shown recently, an entrance cost for a PGG can promote cooperation in a costly PGG, due to the smaller effective size of a costly PGG 26 . For this reason, cooperation is more frequent and defection less frequent in the cooperative, costly PGG, compared to the defective, cost-less PGG.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, punishment of defectors 12 – 19 or rewarding cooperators 20 – 22 can promote social behavior. Cooperation can also evolve when interactions are not obligatory 23 , 24 , or when individuals have a choice between different institutions 25 , 26 . Furthermore, it is shown that the very existence of population structure can promote cooperation due to the assortativity of interactions in structured populations 5 , 27 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

Salahshour

2021

Sci Rep

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The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the evolution of cooperation? To shed light on these questions, here, I consider a population of individuals who possibly play two consecutive rounds of public goods game, with different enhancement factors. Importantly, individuals have independent strategies in the two rounds. However, their strategy in the first round affects the game they play in the second round. I consider two different scenarios where either only first-round cooperators play a second public goods game, or both first-round cooperators and first-round defectors play a second public goods game, but in different groups. The first scenario can be considered a reward dilemma, and the second can be considered an assortative public goods game but with independent strategies of the individuals in the two rounds. Both models show cooperators can survive either in a fixed point or through different periodic orbits. Interestingly, due to the emergence of a correlation between the strategies of the individuals in the two rounds, individuals develop consistent personalities during the evolution. This, in turn, helps cooperation to flourish. These findings shed new light on the evolution of cooperation and show how consistent cooperative and defective personalities can evolve and play a positive role in solving social dilemmas.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

Salahshour

2021

Sci Rep

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“…Evolutionary modelling and analysis of voluntary participation has been considered in several studies [7,20,[68][69][70][71], showing that cooperation can evolve even in one-shot cooperation dilemmas if players have the option to opt out. However, these works did not consider strategies conditioned on the formation of a commitment, nor incentives for encouraging the participation in it.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional incentives for the evolution of committed cooperation: ensuring participation is as important as enhancing compliance

Han

2022

J. R. Soc. Interface.

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Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that arranginga priorcommitment or agreement before an interaction takes place enhances the chance of reaching mutual cooperation. Yet it is not clear what mechanisms might underlie the participation in and compliance with such a commitment, especially when participation is costly and non-compliance can be profitable. Here, we develop a theory of participation and compliance with respect to an explicit commitment formation process and to institutional incentives where individuals, at first, decide whether or not to join a cooperative agreement to play a one-shot social dilemma game. Using a mathematical model, we determine whether and when participating in a costly commitment, and complying with it, is an evolutionarily stable strategy, resulting in high levels of cooperation. We show that, given a sufficient budget for providing incentives, rewarding of commitment compliant behaviours better promotes cooperation than punishment of non-compliant ones. Moreover, by sparing part of this budget for rewarding those willing to participate in a commitment, the overall level of cooperation can be significantly enhanced for both reward and punishment. Finally, the presence of mistakes in deciding to participate favours evolutionary stability of commitment compliance and cooperation.

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“…This theory shows that the very fact that a trait is costly can lead to its scarcity, which in turn can lead to the evolution of favorable strategic responses, as such strategies do not impose a high cost on their bearer. A similar density-dependent selection can give rise to the evolution of cooperation in costly public goods [ 45 ], or consistent cooperative personalities in multistage public goods [ 66 ]. The models studied here show that a similar dynamical phenomenon can underlie the evolution of moral norms in complex strategic settings.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation

Salahshour

2022

PLoS Comput Biol

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In many biological populations, such as human groups, individuals face a complex strategic setting, where they need to make strategic decisions over a diverse set of issues and their behavior in one strategic context can affect their decisions in another. This raises the question of how the interaction between different strategic contexts affects individuals’ strategic choices and social norms? To address this question, I introduce a framework where individuals play two games with different structures and decide upon their strategy in a second game based on their knowledge of their opponent’s strategy in the first game. I consider both multistage games, where the same opponents play the two games consecutively, and reputation-based model, where individuals play their two games with different opponents but receive information about their opponent’s strategy. By considering a case where the first game is a social dilemma, I show that when the second game is a coordination or anti-coordination game, the Nash equilibrium of the coupled game can be decomposed into two classes, a defective equilibrium which is composed of two simple equilibrium of the two games, and a cooperative equilibrium, in which coupling between the two games emerge and sustain cooperation in the social dilemma. For the existence of the cooperative equilibrium, the cost of cooperation should be smaller than a value determined by the structure of the second game. Investigation of the evolutionary dynamics shows that a cooperative fixed point exists when the second game belongs to coordination or anti-coordination class in a mixed population. However, the basin of attraction of the cooperative fixed point is much smaller for the coordination class, and this fixed point disappears in a structured population. When the second game belongs to the anti-coordination class, the system possesses a spontaneous symmetry-breaking phase transition above which the symmetry between cooperation and defection breaks. A set of cooperation supporting moral norms emerges according to which cooperation stands out as a valuable trait. Notably, the moral system also brings a more efficient allocation of resources in the second game. This observation suggests a moral system has two different roles: Promotion of cooperation, which is against individuals’ self-interest but beneficial for the population, and promotion of organization and order, which is at both the population’s and the individual’s self-interest. Interestingly, the latter acts like a Trojan horse: Once established out of individuals’ self-interest, it brings the former with itself. Importantly, the fact that the evolution of moral norms depends only on the cost of cooperation and is independent of the benefit of cooperation implies that moral norms can be harmful and incur a pure collective cost, yet they are just as effective in promoting order and organization. Finally, the model predicts that recognition noise can have a surprisingly positive effect on the evolution of moral norms and facilitates cooperation in the Snow Drift game in structured populations.

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Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods

Cited by 6 publications

References 73 publications

Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

Institutional incentives for the evolution of committed cooperation: ensuring participation is as important as enhancing compliance

Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation

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