Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory

Luo, Jun; Ma, Baichao; Zhao, Yanyun; Chen, Tingqiang

doi:10.1155/2018/8769563

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…Evolutionary game analysis based on the behavior of participants has become one of the main tools of the analysis of food safety, this is because it can involve government, consumers, companies, and other subjects. Current studies from the perspective of the evolutionary game between the two participants mainly consist of games between the government and companies [ 28 ], and between food suppliers and manufacturers [ 29 ]; the studies from the perspective of tripartite participants mainly consist of games of governments, companies, as well as consumers [ 30 ].…”

Section: Methods and Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

Xue

Geng

Kiprop

et al. 2021

Foods

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The food safety strategies of companies are a key point in the reduction of food safety risks. In order to encourage the evolution of food safety strategies of companies from food fraud to safety investment, this study builds an evolutionary game model, taking large and small companies as participants, to reveal the dynamic process of spillover effects influencing the choice of food safety strategies of companies. The study shows that (1) the food safety strategies of companies change from safety investment to food fraud, along with the increasing opportunity costs of safety investment. (2) The costs structure of small companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of safety investment, while the costs structure of large companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of food fraud. (3) Both competition effects and contagion effects encourage companies to choose safety investment. The more obvious spillover effects of incidents on food safety are, the more likely it is that companies will choose safety investments. (4) Increasing the costs to companies for incidents on food safety and reducing the opportunity cost of safety investment motivates companies to choose safety investment. Consequently, a new orientation of regulations for food safety is formed: the government should allocate different regulatory resources to counteract food fraud behaviors or technologies with a different benefit, should increase the technical costs and costs incurred from committing acts of food fraud, and should expand spillover effects of incidents on food safety.

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Section: Methods and Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

Xue

Geng

Kiprop

et al. 2021

Foods

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Luo et al developed a three-party game model of health food safety risk evolution, which includes health food enterprises, consumers, and government regulators. ey conclude that the influence mechanism of factors such as information search payment, consumers' subjective perception, and regulatory authority's certification affect food safety risks [28]. Based on the above, Luo et al argue that consumers' sensitivity to health food safety supervision information can help improve the profitability of enterprises [29].…”

Section: Food Safety Standards and Monitoring Evaluation In Localmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…rough simulation experiments, they found that false food safety information cannot be solved effectively, only relying on government supervision. Scholars construct food safety evolutionary game model from different theoretical perspectives [27][28][29]. e results showed that it is difficult to achieve the stable evolutionary strategy with the constraint conditions [27].…”

Section: Food Safety Standards and Monitoring Evaluation In Localmentioning

confidence: 99%

Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

et al. 2021

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Food safety risk communication has attracted widespread attention in China. The government is the leader in food risk communication. It has even more impact on consumers’ willingness to communicate food risk. Thus, this paper constructs a risk communication game model composed of the central government, local government, and consumers under food safety regulatory agencies in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. In the end, some numerical examples have been displayed to simulate the agents’ choices. The results show that penalty cost, governance intensity, communication cost, and reputation of the government have an essential impact on consumers’ enthusiasm for food safety risk communication decision-making behavior. Furthermore, the choice of food safety risk communication strategies is performed with a dynamic process, which is constantly adjusted and optimized. The evolutionary game system can converge on an ideal state under certain conditions. Moreover, this study proposes suggestions and measures conducive to the tripartite game, which can offer valuable guidance on food risk communication practice and improve government efficiency in China. This research can provide the evolutionary mechanism and broaden our understanding of the relationship between food safety risk governance and food risk communication strategies.

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“…Of course, the tripartite evolutionary game theory also has a wide range of applications. For example, Jiang et al [26] constructed a threeparty game model that was analyzed and simulated by adopting dynamics to obtain the regulation strategies for an online shopping problem; Luo et al [27] constructed and researched a tripartite game model of health food safety risk evolution to provide a theoretical basis for effective market governance; Long et al [28] constructed a tripartite game model involving the government, consumers, and companies to explore the evolutionary equilibrium and the main driving factors for environmental problems; Liu et al [29] analyzed the stability of a coal mine safety monitoring system based on tripartite evolutionary game theory and proposed forward control schemes such as dynamic fines. erefore, it is reasonable and innovative to use the threeparty evolutionary game theory to study the cleaner production quality regulation strategy of the pharmaceutical.…”

Section: Related Literaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cleaner Production Quality Regulation Strategy of Pharmaceutical with Collusive Behavior and Patient Feedback

Rong

Zhu

2020

Complexity

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The quality of pharmaceuticals has always been a hot issue in the world, and it involves public health, economic development of countries, social stability, and national security. Cleaner production is a prerequisite for ensuring the quality of medicines. However, the various types of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and fake vaccines exposed in the recent years have revealed many problems, such as lacking government regulation, loose quality management of companies, illegal profit of medical service agencies, and failure of patient complaints. This paper’s two innovations are as follows: first, it not only considers the collusion between pharmaceutical companies and medical service agencies, but also introduces patient feedback to study drug quality regulation strategies from a microperspective; second, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving cleaner production pharmaceutical companies, medical service agencies, and the governments to analyze the evolutionary stability using the Lyapunov first rule. The results of the research show that, first, improvement of patient complaint rates can effectively curb collusive behavior and promote the stable improvement of cleaner production drug quality; second, the governments must impose sufficient fines on pharmaceutical companies to avoid a stable strategic combination of collusion; third, enhancing patient feedback can speed up the evolution of the stable choice of legitimate strategies by pharmaceutical companies and the medical service agencies; finally, the government reducing the strict regulation costs can increase the strict regulation rate employed in the evolution process and slow down the pace of evolution to loose regulation. In addition, the simulation analysis was carried out using Matlab 2017b, which verified the validity of the model and proved the practical meaning of countermeasures and suggestions for improving government quality regulation.

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Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory

Cited by 14 publications

References 20 publications

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

How Do Spillover Effects Influence the Food Safety Strategies of Companies? New Orientation of Regulations for Food Safety

Food Safety Risk Communication between the Food Regulator and Consumer in China: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Cleaner Production Quality Regulation Strategy of Pharmaceutical with Collusive Behavior and Patient Feedback

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