Evolution and simulation of drug safety regulations: construction of a game model for capture event

Wan, Anxia; Huang, Qianqian; Elahi, Ehsan; Peng, Benhong

doi:10.1108/k-08-2022-1184

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 34 publications

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“…Consequently, they have developed multi-party evolutionary game models for further improvement [48][49][50]. In recent years, some scholars have integrated prospect theory and mental accounting theory into evolutionary games, improving the traditional payoff matrix to a perception-based payoff matrix and applying it to safety management [51,52].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Three-Party Decision Evolution Game Analysis of Coal Companies and Miners under China’s Government Safety Special Rectification Action

Xie,

Li,

Chen

2023

Mathematics

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Research on the behavior of coal companies and miners under the government’s safety special rectification action is significant for maintaining social stability. In this paper, we constructed a dynamic evolutionary game model involving the government, coal companies, and miners. We analyzed the asymptotic stability conditions of the behavioral strategies of the participants in the game through phase diagrams and conducted a simulation analysis using Matlab R2021b to explore the impact of the key parameters in the model on the strategic choices of the game participants. The research findings indicated: (1) intricate interactive dynamics exist among the three stakeholders in safety rectification endeavors, with diverse intervention strategies manifesting varying impacts on participants’ conduct and outcomes; (2) setting reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms for safety behaviors by the government toward coal companies and miners helps to increase the probability of both choosing proactive safety behaviors. Coal companies that set reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms for the safety behaviors of miners can promote miners’ willingness to cooperate. Additionally, reducing safety rectification costs and enhancing the social reputation benefits of safety rectification can facilitate the optimal strategic choices of the three parties; and (3) the simulation analysis results corroborate the conclusions on the stability of strategies across all stakeholders, affirming the validity of the research outcomes and furnishing pertinent recommendations for enhancing the safety rectification framework.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Three-Party Decision Evolution Game Analysis of Coal Companies and Miners under China’s Government Safety Special Rectification Action

Xie,

Li,

Chen

2023

Mathematics

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Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of multi-stakeholder behaviour for promoting Braille labelling on pharmaceutical packaging in China’s legal framework

Feng,

Liu,

Zhao

et al. 2024

Humanit Soc Sci Commun

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This study investigates the factors influencing the lack of Braille-embossed labels in Chinese pharmaceutical product packaging. To this end, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of multi-participant behaviour in drug production regulation and conducts simulation based on the perspective of stakeholders in order to study the evolutionary steady state of regulatory authorities, pharmaceutical companies, and visually impaired individuals and the influence of each parameter variable on the choice of strategic behaviour of the participants. The simulation results show that in the legal framework of China, administrative penalties, the production subsidy rate, and the Basic Medical Insurance (BMI) reimbursement rate are the main drivers of the system’s evolution towards a steady state. Reduced costs of drugs with Braille-embossed packaging is a prerequisite for the visually impaired to purchase such drugs, and the key for the whole system to converge to a stable state therefore lies in the BMI reimbursement rate for drugs with Braille-embossed packaging. This paper suggests that the Chinese government should improve the law enforcement mechanism for the regulation of the production of drugs with Braille-embossed packaging; increase the type and intensity of administrative penalties as well as production subsidies, tax incentives, and compliance incentives for pharmaceutical companies; and provide higher BMI reimbursement rates for the visually impaired. The results of the study provide valuable insights to improve accessibility to drugs and build a barrier-free environment for ensuring medication safety in China and other developing countries.

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Punish or reward? How to strengthen supervision of nucleic acid testing

Kai

Liu

Wang

et al. 2023

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PurposeNucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.Design/methodology/approachThis paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.FindingsThe authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.Originality/valueMost of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

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Evolution and simulation of drug safety regulations: construction of a game model for capture event

Cited by 4 publications

References 34 publications

A Three-Party Decision Evolution Game Analysis of Coal Companies and Miners under China’s Government Safety Special Rectification Action

A Three-Party Decision Evolution Game Analysis of Coal Companies and Miners under China’s Government Safety Special Rectification Action

Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of multi-stakeholder behaviour for promoting Braille labelling on pharmaceutical packaging in China’s legal framework

Punish or reward? How to strengthen supervision of nucleic acid testing

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