Evil is privation

Anglin, Bill; Goetz, Stewart

doi:10.1007/bf00148934

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Whilst there are numerous philosophers who defend it explicitly (Oderberg, ; , ch. 5‐8; Anglin & Goetz, ; Davies, , pp. 143–148; Lee, ; Alexander, , ch.…”

Section: Intrinsic Coherence Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

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Baker-Hytch

2020

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met.

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“…Whilst there are numerous philosophers who defend it explicitly (Oderberg, ; , ch. 5‐8; Anglin & Goetz, ; Davies, , pp. 143–148; Lee, ; Alexander, , ch.…”

Section: Intrinsic Coherence Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

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Baker-Hytch

2020

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…This perhaps implies a simpler ontology: it requires only ‘good’ as a primitive natural kind. Collins points us to Anglin and Goetz's (1982) argument: Nothing is evil unless it is destroying (or corrupting) something. Thus it is not possible that something evil not be destroying something. If there were something inherently evil it could exist apart from other things, destroying neither them nor itself. Thus there cannot be anything inherently evil. …”

Section: The Simplicity Of Theism Over Maltheismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why God is probably good: a response to the evil-god challenge

Miller

2019

Rel. Stud.

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A number of philosophers have recently defended the evil-god challenge, which is to explain relevant asymmetries between believing in a perfectly good God and believing in a perfectly evil god, such that the former is more reasonable than the latter. In this article, I offer a number of such reasons. I first suggest that certain conceptions of the ontology of good and evil can offer asymmetries which make theism a simpler hypothesis than ‘maltheism’. I then argue that maltheism is itself complex in a variety of ways: it is difficult to articulate a simple precise version of maltheism; maltheism posits a mixture of positive and negative properties; maltheism posits a more complex relationship between moral motivation, practical reason and action; and maltheism relevantly parallels other epistemically ‘complex’ sceptical scenarios.

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“…positively] evil might serve in the fulfilment of a surpassingly good divine purpose could equally well be served by a privative evil.The only way an omnipotent being's goodness would not be compromised if he created something inherently evil would be if that thing were logically necessary to the fulfilment of every surpassingly good purpose.Necessarily, God is good.Thus God does not create anything inherently evil.Thus nothing is inherently evil. (Anglin & Goetz (1982), 9) (The premise numbers in this argument and the next have been changed from the original text. )This is an example of the latter, which Anglin and Goetz say can be gleaned from St Augustine's The Writings against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists : Nothing is evil unless it is destroying (or corrupting) something.Thus it is not possible that something evil not be destroying something.If there were something inherently evil it could exist apart from other things, destroying neither them nor itself.Thus there cannot be anything inherently evil.Thus evil is just privation.…”

Section: The Evil-god Challenge Extendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus nothing is inherently evil. (Anglin & Goetz (1982), 9) (The premise numbers in this argument and the next have been changed from the original text. )…”

Section: The Evil-god Challenge Extendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evil-god challenge: extended and defended

Collins

2018

Rel. Stud.

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Stephen Law developed a challenge to theism, known as the evil-god challenge (Law (2010) ). The evil-god challenge to theism is to explain why the theist's responses to the problem of evil are any better than the diabolist's – who believes in a supremely evil god – rejoinders to the problem of good, when all the theist's ploys (theodicy, sceptical theism, etc.) can be parodied by the diabolist.In the first part of this article, I extend the evil-god challenge by showing that additional theist replies to the problem of evil (more theodicies, the privation view of evil, and others) also may be appropriated, with just as much plausibility, in support of the diabolist position. In the second part of the article, I defend the evil-god challenge against several objections.

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Evil is privation

Cited by 17 publications

References 2 publications

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

Why God is probably good: a response to the evil-god challenge

The evil-god challenge: extended and defended

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