Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof

Abstract

This Article analyzes the probabilistic and epistemological underpinnings of the burden of proof doctrine. We show that this doctrine is best understood as instructing factfinders to determine which of the parties' conflicting stories makes most sense in terms of coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential coverage. By applying this method, factfinders should try-and will often succeed-to establish the truth, rather than a statistical surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error. Descriptively, we argue that this understanding of the doctrine-the "relative plausibility theory"-corresponds to our courts' practice. Prescriptively, we argue that the relative-plausibility method is operationally superior to factfinding that relies on mathematical probability. This method aligns with people's natural reasoning and common sense, avoids paradoxes engendered by mathematical probability, and seamlessly integrates with the rules of substantive law that guide individuals' primary conduct and determine liabilities and entitlements. We substantiate this claim by juxtaposing the extant doctrine against two recent contributions to evidence theory: Professor Louis Kaplow's proposal that the burden of proof should be modified to track the statistical distributions of harms and benefits associated with relevant primary activities; and Professor Edward Cheng's model that calls on factfinders to make their decisions by using numbers instead of words. Specifically, we demonstrate that both models suffer from serious conceptual problems and are not feasible operationally. The extant burden of proof doctrine, we conclude, works well and requires no far-reaching reforms.

Atomismo Y Holismo en La Justificación Probatoria

“…46 Para un análisis de esta clase de falacia, véase Van Eemeren y Garssen, 2009. 47 Cfr., por ejemplo, Allen y Leiter, 2001, p. 1528Allen y Stein, 2013, p. 575 y Amaya, 2013 Cfr., por ejemplo, Allen y Leiter, 2001, pp. 1534 y ss.…”

“…4 De hecho, el propio Wigmore presenta su modelo de análisis como una alternativa superior -"the only thorough and scientifi c method" (1913, p. 858)-a lo que llama "método narrativo" (1913, p. 821), caracterizado por la integración de los datos probatorios en el marco de un relato de la secuencia de hechos del caso. 5 Cfr.Allen, 1994; Pardo, 2000;Pardo y Allen, 2008;Allen y Stein, 2013; Amaya, 2009 Amaya, y 2013 Cfr.Twining, 1990; Anderson, Twining y Schum, 2005, pp. 145 y ss.…”

“…Cfr.Allen, 1994; Pardo, 2000;Allen, 2008;Pardo y Allen, 2008;Pardo, 2013; Allen y Stein, 2013. 23 La identifi cación y denominación de los criterios que determinan la opción entre explicaciones en confl icto presenta diferencias signifi cativas entre diversos textos de los autores (cfr.Allen, 2008, p. 326;Allen y Stein, 2013). No se encuentran tampoco en ellos defi niciones precisas de esos criterios.…”

Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defence

“…We fault them for assuming an outdated and inexhaustive catalogue of 'interpretations of 2 Posner 1973. 3 Including Tribe 1971;Cohen 1977;Jaffee 1984-5;Laudan 2006;Allen1991, 2017Allen and Leiter 2001;Allen and Stein 2013;and Haack 2014. 4 Kagehiro and Stanton 1985. probability' (or ways to understand probabilistic claims), which lead them to ignore the possibility of integrating the explanatory and other epistemological considerations that they rightly emphasize into a probabilistic framework.…”

Litigation and the Product Rule: A Rent Seeking Approach

“…For that reason, it has provoked an extensive scholarly debate during the last four decades (see e.g. Kaye, 1979;Levmore, 2001;Stein, 2001;Allen and Stein, 2013;Cheng, 2013;Clermont, 2013). When fact finders are not instructed to multiply the probabilities attached to discrete elements of a lawsuit, the law allows plaintiffs to win cases upon aggregate probabilities that fall well below fifty percent.…”