Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

Fantl, Jeremy; McGrath, Matthew

doi:10.2307/3182570

Cited by 139 publications

(190 citation statements)

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“…Interestingly, Fantl and McGrath (, p. 85) describe a case remarkably similar to this one. Even more interestingly, they use the case in the course of arguing for an action‐environment link.…”

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confidence: 57%

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Fritz

2017

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Subject‐sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject‐sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge‐attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This article argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.

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confidence: 57%

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Fritz

2017

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…It is not clear, however, that they are entirely unwelcome. As Ballantyne is well aware, recent work on pragmatic encroachment in epistemology seems to have similar consequences (Hawthorne ; Fantl and McGrath ). Ballantyne thinks the problem he identifies for anti‐luck epistemology is different from “normal” cases of pragmatic encroachment because increasing the significance of an event may not just prevent knowledge but “Gettierize” one’s belief.…”

Section: Two Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 95%

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck

Grefte

2019

Metaphilosophy

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This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.

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“…There have been a variety of proposals for an interest‐relative invariantist account of rational belief. Fantl and McGrath's (, ) proposal is, perhaps, the most well known of these, but Dorit Ganson () and David Owens () have also advocated similar views.…”

Section: Interest‐relative Invariantism About Maximally Rational Beliefmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Fantl and McGrath's () interest‐relative account is centered on a principle Fantl and McGrath call PCA: PCA : S is justified in believing that p only if it is rational for S to act as if p On Fantl and McGrath's picture, the practical stakes of a subject fixes a standard of evidential support required for maximally rational belief.…”

Section: Interest‐relative Invariantism About Maximally Rational Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness

Rubin¹

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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This article explores the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissiveness. If the suggestion that all epistemic notions are interest-relative is viable (as Jason Stanley has recently claimed), then it seems that a certain species of epistemic permissivism must be viable as well. For, if all epistemic notions are interest relative then, sometimes, parties in paradigmatic cases of shared evidence can be maximally rational in forming competing basic doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. However, I argue that this total pragmatic encroachment is not tenable, and, thus, epistemic permissivism cannot be vindicated in this way.

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Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification

Cited by 139 publications

References 0 publications

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck

Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness

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