Evidence on learning in coordination games

Huyck, John B. Van; Battalio, Raymond C.; Rankin, Frederick W.

doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z

“…-Lower costs of experimentation such as increasing the number of rounds while keeping the overall earnings roughly the same, or refining the actions space, or some combination thereof, are efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 1998;Van Huyck et al, 2001). -Lower costs of exerting effort is efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2005).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001) directly tested the claim that order statistic and group size are substitutes by experimentally crossing two group sizes (5 and 7) and two order statistics (2 and 4) in a 2 x 2 design that also featured a dramatically increased action space (101 actions) and a relatively large number of periods. The authors carefully analyze initial, adaptive, and terminal behavior.…”

Section: Coordination Requirement: Order Statistic and Group Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001) explore the consequences of a finer action grid (as well as the impact of order statistic and number of players). Letting their subjects choose among 101 actions (and letting them run through twice the numbers of rounds), Van Huyck et al (2001) find that local exploration is "skewed in the direction of efficiency" (p. 14).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Letting their subjects choose among 101 actions (and letting them run through twice the numbers of rounds), Van Huyck et al (2001) find that local exploration is "skewed in the direction of efficiency" (p. 14). It is possible, and likely -in light of the observed perfect correlation between "creeping up" and time in some of the treatments and the results by Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) --, that this result is due to both the refined action space as well as the increased number of rounds.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory

Devetag

¹

,

Ortmann²

2006

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Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that coordination failure is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, both in the lab and outside of it.

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“…Letting their subjects choose among 101 actions (and letting them run through twice the numbers of rounds), Van Huyck et al (2001) find that local exploration is "skewed in the direction of efficiency" (p. 14). It is possible, and likely -in light of the observed perfect correlation between "creeping up" and time in some of the treatments and the results by Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) --, that this result is due to both the refined action space as well as the increased number of rounds.…”

Section: Laboratory Evidence Of Coordination Failures and Successesmentioning

confidence: 99%

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

Devetag

¹

,

Ortmann

²

2007

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that coordination failure is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, both in the lab and outside of it.

show abstract

The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

Gong

¹

,

Heal

²

,

Krantz

³

et al. 2014

Behavioral Decision Making

6

0

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Can subsidies promote Pareto‐optimum coordination? We found that partially subsidizing the cooperative actions for two out of six players in a laboratory coordination game usually produced better coordination and higher total social welfare with both deterministic and stochastic payoffs. Not only were the subsidized players more likely to cooperate (choose the Pareto‐optimum action), but the unsubsidized players increased their expectations on how likely others would cooperate, and they cooperated more frequently themselves. After removal of the subsidy, high levels of coordination continued in most groups with stochastic payoffs but declined in deterministic ones. This carry‐over disparity between the deterministic and stochastic settings was consistent with the economic theories that agents were more likely to keep the status quo option under uncertainty than without uncertainty. Hence, players with stochastic payoffs were more likely to keep the high coordination level (status quo) brought by the subsidy in the previous subsidy session. A post‐game survey also indicated that with stochastic payoffs, players focused on risk reduction. Temporary subsidies promoted lasting coordination because even after subsidy was removed, players still assumed that others players would prefer reduced risks from cooperation. With deterministic payoffs, however, the subsidy might crowd out other rationales for coordination, with many players indicating that the subsidy was the only reason for anyone to cooperate. Hence, the coordination level dropped when the subsidy was removed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Evidence on learning in coordination games

Abstract: Coordination, Equilibrium selection, Learning, Strategic uncertainty, Adaptive behavior, c72, c92,

Cited by 34 publications

References 7 publications

When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory

When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

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