Evidence of partner choice heuristics in a one-shot bargaining game

Cross-cultural regularities in the cognitive architecture of pride

“…Moreover, these theories led to the empirical discovery of an array of specialized choice architectures that implement welfare-tradeoff decisions given the information available to the actor about an interaction partner [e.g., how to respond to cues of the recipient's relatedness, skills, generosity, attractiveness, ability to defend her interests, etc. (6,(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)]. Each specific theory provides contentful predictions about the dimensions of the psychology of valuation in our species that the pride system targets (e.g., productivity, generosity, bravery, strength, health, and attractiveness).…”

Wealth-relative effects in cooperation games

“…The other participants were strangers and most were not visible. It has been shown that humans use facial cues even in one-shot games in choosing strategies (Eisenbruch, Grillot, Maestripieri and Roney 2016), so they remained strangers.…”

Evolutionary perspectives on the mechanistic underpinnings of personality

“…Research conducted from this perspective has reverse-engineered many psychological mechanisms whose design features exhibit a close functional match with the structure of specific adaptive problems faced by human ancestors. For example, the adaptive problem of detecting predators selected for mechanisms which constantly scan the visual field for ancestrally valid cues of agency, and direct attention in response to these cues (New et al, 2007); adaptive problems of avoiding exploitation in social exchange relationships selected for mechanisms designed to identify cheaters (in dyadic relationships) and free-riders (in collective actions), and to prevent these individuals from enjoying the benefits of cooperation ; the adaptive problem of incest avoidance selected for mechanisms designed to estimate the genetic relatedness of the self to other individuals, and to inhibit sexual attraction to people estimated to be close relatives (Lieberman et al, 2007); the adaptive problem of pathogen avoidance selected for a suite of mechanisms designed to prevent and mitigate the costs of exposure to pathogens (Murray & Schaller, 2016;Tybur et al, 2009); the adaptive problem of avoiding ingestion of plant toxins selected for mechanisms designed to learn which local plants are edible via social observation (Wertz & Wynn, 2014); adaptive problems related to the regulation of conflict escalation selected for mechanisms designed to accurately estimate others' physical formidability from visual and auditory cues (Sell et al, 2009a;2010); adaptive problems related to coalitional conflict and cooperation selected for a suite of mechanisms for tracking alliances based on observable cues of coordination and conflict (Kurzban et al, 2003;Pietraszewski et al, 2014); the adaptive problem of maintaining long-term pair-bonds selected for motivations to implement "mate retention" tactics ; and adaptive problems related to capturing benefits via social relationships crafted mechanisms that differentially value others on the basis of cues that would have ancestrally predicted their generation of net benefits as mates (Buss, 1989;Buss & Schmitt, 1993;Lukaszewski & Roney, 2010), cooperative partners (Eisenbruch et al, 2016), coalition members , warriors (Patton, 2000), and leaders (Lukaszewski et al, 2016). For detailed catalogues of recently discovered human psychological adaptations, readers are directed to broader reviews (e.g., Buss, 2012;Tooby & Cosmides, 2015).…”

“…A consequence of this is that human entitlement to contested resources is regulated not only by the ability to inflict costs on others, but also the ability to generate benefits as an ally, exchange partner, mate, or leader (Lukaszewski et al, 2016;Sell et al, 2009b;von Rueden et al, 2008). This is reflected in the independent positive effects of formidability and social value on humans' (i) felt entitlement to resources (Lukaszewski, 2013;Peterson et al, 2013;Sell et al, 2009b), and (ii) allocation of contested resources and preferential treatment to formidable or valuable others (Eisenbruch et al, 2016;Sell et al, 2009b;von Rueden et al, 2008).…”