Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence Under Screening-Off

Roche, William

doi:10.1017/epi.2013.40

Cited by 15 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Each of John's credences is either high or not high, either in a proposition for which his total evidence is evidence-HP or not in a proposition for which his total evidence is evidence-HP, and either in a true proposition or not in a true proposition. Suppose that you know that: 11 These points about EEE** NDC carry over to an EEE thesis put forward in Roche (2014).…”

Section: A Counterexample To Tandc's Eee Thesismentioning

confidence: 97%

“…See Roche and Shogenji (2014a) for relevant discussion. (Roche 2014) is right, then the answer is negative. This is because the case at hand is a case where H 1 screens-off E from H 2 (in that E has no negative impact on H 2 's probability given the truth or falsity of H 1 ) and thus the third condition in EEE SOC 's antecedent holds.…”

Section: Now Consider the Followingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. I argue, in fact, for four distinct theses to that effect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off vs. No-Defeaters

Roche¹

2017

Episteme

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I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

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Section: A Counterexample To Tandc's Eee Thesismentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Now Consider the Followingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off vs. No-Defeaters

Roche¹

2017

Episteme

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“…The second is established in Shogenji (2003). See Roche (2014) for discussion of the first condition in the context of peer disagreement. See Roche and Shogenji (2014a) for discussion of the first condition in the context of Moore's proof of the existence of a material world.…”

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confidence: 97%

Explanation, Confirmation, and Hempel’s Paradox

Roche¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Hempel’s Converse Consequence Condition (CCC), Entailment Condition (EC), and Special Consequence Condition (SCC) have some prima facie plausibility when taken individually. Hempel, though, shows that they have no plausibility when taken together, for together they entail that E confirms H for any propositions E and H. This is “Hempel’s paradox.” It turns out that Hempel’s argument would fail if one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC were modified in terms of explanation. This opens up the possibility that Hempel’s paradox can be solved by modifying one or more of CCC, EC, and SCC in terms of explanation. This chapter explores this possibility by modifying CCC and SCC in terms of explanation and considering whether CCC and SCC so modified are correct. It also relates that possibility to Inference to the Best Explanation.

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“…Rather than dissecting Hardwig's arguments once again, I prefer to make a more direct case against (NE), one to the effect that (NE) turns out to be normally false when 6 quite natural formalizations of epistemic notions that Hardwig would seem to presuppose are put into operation. My argument deploys Shogenji-Roche theorem of transitivity of incremental confirmation (see Shogenji 2003 andRoche 2014). …”

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confidence: 98%

Evidence of Expert's Evidence Is Evidence

Moretti¹

2015

Episteme

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John Hardwig has championed the thesis (NE) that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP's testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that (NE) yields tensions within Hardwig's overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche's theorem of transitivity of incremental confirmation to show that (NE) is false if a natural Bayesian formalization of the above notion of evidence is implemented. I concede that Hardwig could resist my Bayesian objection if he intended (NE) as a more precise thesis that only applies to communityfocused evidence. I argue, however, that this precisification, while diminishing the philosophical relevance of (NE), wouldn't settle the tensions internal to Hardwig's views.Hardwig (1985, 1991) maintains that our epistemic reliance on experts is typically blind, in the sense that when we acquire reasons to believe a proposition P because an expert asserts P, we typically don't know, and often couldn't possibly know, the evidence that the expert has for P.Consider for instance an expert EXP and a proposition P about facts within her expertise domain.(EXP could be an astrophysicist and P a hypothesis about black holes.) Take the proposition: (E) EXP has asserted P in the role as an expert.Also consider a layman, or an expert in an area different from EXP's, LAY. According to Hardwig, in ordinary contexts, E is for LAY evidence for the proposition: (K) EXP has evidence for P. (Cf. 1985: 137) And this is so even if the evidence that LAY would think EXP has for P were unknown or--because of LAY's lack of appropriate training and skills--inaccessible and even ungraspable to LAY. (Cf. 1985: 339 and 1991: 699). Hardwig claims that LAY's learning E can give LAY reasons for * I'm very grateful to Lorenzo Casini, Richard Dawid, Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Fed Luzzi, Tommaso Piazza, Tomoji Shogenji, Karim Thebault and two reviewers of this Journal for very helpful comments and criticism upon drafts of this paper.

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Evidence of Evidence Is Evidence Under Screening-Off

Cited by 15 publications

References 10 publications

Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off vs. No-Defeaters

Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off vs. No-Defeaters

Explanation, Confirmation, and Hempel’s Paradox

Evidence of Expert's Evidence Is Evidence

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