Evidence of a transition from perceptual to category induction in 3- to 9-year-old children

Badger, Julia; Shapiro, Laura

doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2012.03.004

Cited by 35 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(44 reference statements)

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“…The naïve theory account emphasizes early competence in making category-based inferences and continuity in the patterns of inductive generalization from early childhood to adulthood. Yet, a number of recent studies have reported a marked agerelated decrease in reliance on perceptual similarity and a marked age-related increase in the use of object kind information in the course of inductive generalization (Badger & Shapiro, 2012;Fisher, Matlen, & Godwin, 2011;Godwin, Matlen, & Fisher, 2013;Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Such age-related differences in performance clearly pose a challenge to the naïve theory account.…”

Section: Perceptual Similarity Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case, an inference could be label-based without necessarily being categorybased. Several related findings suggest that children rely primarily on perceptual features of objects (but not category membership information) to make inferences well beyond the preschool years, possibly until 7 to 9 years of age (Badger & Shapiro, 2012;Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005;Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007).…”

Section: Perceptual Similarity Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Early studies of inductive generalization concluded that Bby 2½ years, children expect categories to promote rich inductive inferences… and they can overlook conflicting perceptual appearances in doing so^ (Gelman & Coley, 1990, p. 802; see also Gelman & Markman, 1986;Gelman & Wellman, 1991). However, there is now overwhelming evidence that young children do not (and perhaps, cannot) ignore perceptual similarity when making inductive inferences (Badger & Shapiro, 2012;Sloutsky, Lo, & Fisher, 2001;Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004;Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Moreover, the conclusion that perceptual similarity makes a large contribution to children's inferences has now been confirmed even by those researchers who initially opposed this idea (Graham, Booth, & Waxman, 2012;Noles & Gelman, 2012;c.f.…”

Section: Perceptual and Representational Similarity (Pars) Account Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As discussed, some studies suggest that children are unlikely to make category-consistent inferences until approximately 9 years of age (Badger & Shapiro, 2012;Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007), whereas other studies report that children can make such inferences by 6 years of age Godwin et al, 2013;Long et al 2011). Aside from procedural differences among these studies, a potentially important distinction is that the former studies used novel artificial categories whereas the latter studies used real familiar categories.…”

Section: Inconsistencies In Developmental Trajectoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relative immaturity of inhibitory control may contribute to children's performance on tasks that select items in such a way that perceptual similarity is in conflict with category membership (for examples of such tasks see Badger & Shapiro, 2012;Fisher, 2011;Gelman & Markman, 1986;Gentner, 1978;Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004;Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Participants in these studies typically include children between 3 and 5 years of age, a period during which inhibitory control is known to undergo significant development (Akshoomoff, 2002;Carlson, 2005;Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994).…”

Section: Novel Predictions Of the Pars Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Development of inductive generalization with familiar categories

2015

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Inductive generalization is ubiquitous in human cognition. In the developmental literature, two different theoretical accounts of this important process have been proposed: a naïve theory account and a similarity-based account. However, a number of recent findings cannot be explained within the existing theoretical accounts. We describe a revised version of the similarity-based account of inductive generalization with familiar categories. We tested the novel predictions of this account in two reported studies with 4-year-old children (N = 57). The reported studies include the first short-term longitudinal investigation of the development of children's induction with familiar categories, and it is the first study to explore the role of individual differences in semantic organization, general intelligence, working memory, and inhibition in children's induction.

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Section: Perceptual Similarity Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Perceptual Similarity Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Perceptual and Representational Similarity (Pars) Account Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Inconsistencies In Developmental Trajectoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Novel Predictions Of the Pars Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Development of inductive generalization with familiar categories

2015

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The Development of Reasoning

Ricco

2015

Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science

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This chapter discusses the course of development for deductive and inductive forms of reasoning across childhood and adolescence. Key theories of how best to account for that course are critiqued. The development of deduction is considered primarily with respect to syllogistic and conditional reasoning. Mental logic, metacognitive, and mental models accounts of deduction are contrasted and compared and the potential for rapprochement is identified. The development of inductive reasoning is discussed with respect to three primary types of induction—category‐based induction, causal induction, and inductive processes in scientific thinking. The discussion of the development of reasoning provided in this chapter is situated within a dual systems or dual process account of cognition. According to this account, human cognition consists of two distinct systems (1 and 2) or types of processing, with the primary basis for the distinction being the question of whether processing engages working memory resources. By adopting this framework, it becomes possible to shed light on the processes that underlie deductive and inductive reasoning and to trace how the development of each type of reasoning is related to changes in these underlying processes. Among the key conclusions of the chapter is that while the development of certain aspects of System 1 processing contributes to age‐related changes in performance on reasoning tasks, the most significant changes in both deductive and inductive reasoning result from key developments in System 2 processing.

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