Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

Bossert, Walter; Sprumont, Yves

doi:10.3982/ecta11419

Cited by 17 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(16 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Since my focus is the implementation of decision rules, it is necessary to adapt an agenda T on the universal issue X to every sub‐issue

A \subset X

. The most natural way to do this is to remove all of the terminal nodes labeled by infeasible alternatives (see Xu and Zhou 2007, Horan 2011, Bossert and Sprumont 2013).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

Horan

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so‐called Euro–Latin and Anglo–American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features—history‐independence and persistence—are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order‐of‐voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

show abstract

“…Since my focus is the implementation of decision rules, it is necessary to adapt an agenda T on the universal issue X to every sub‐issue

A \subset X

. The most natural way to do this is to remove all of the terminal nodes labeled by infeasible alternatives (see Xu and Zhou 2007, Horan 2011, Bossert and Sprumont 2013).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

Horan

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To solve this model, the decision-making factors of the game players must be gradually analyzed according to the backward induction method [51,52]. In contrast with the transaction process shown in Figure 1, first, the profit function of the market follower must be analyzed to solve the profit maximization condition under market sales unit price p. Then, incorporate this condition into the profit function of the market leader and solve its profit maximization condition under revenue-sharing ratio α and viewing effect t. Thus, the equilibrium solution of the dynamic game model with complete information can be obtained.…”

Section: Equilibrium Analysis Of the Stackelberg Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pricing Strategy of Digital Content Resources Based on a Stackelberg Game

Yan

Yuan

2022

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper uses a Stackelberg game model to analyze the profit function composition of digital content resource producers and publishers and uses a numerical simulation method to explore the equilibrium relationships between the various factors that affect the pricing strategy. The findings are as follows: ① platform-based publishers of digital content resources adopt a cost-plus pricing method for a single broadcast price; ② the revenue-sharing ratio of the producers decreases as the single broadcast cost increases; ③ the viewing effect is affected by many factors, such as copyright fees, investment difficulty, sales coefficient, and unit cost. Overall, the main contribution of this manuscript is to make an innovative demonstration and analysis of the factors affecting the pricing strategy of digital content resources, and the results of this paper can promote the transaction of digital content resources and ensure the sustainable development of the digital content industry.

show abstract

Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set

2024

Economics Letters

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

Cited by 17 publications

References 13 publications

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

The Pricing Strategy of Digital Content Resources Based on a Stackelberg Game

Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About