2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2016.03.001
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out?

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
28
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5
4
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 46 publications
(30 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
2
28
0
Order By: Relevance
“…closely interconnected banking systems (Deutsche Bank, 2014). Bank resolutions were costly, indeed, during the 2008-2012 period, with public interventions amounting to roughly 600 billion euros (excluding guarantee schemes), that is, 4.6% of the European gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 (Benczur et al, 2017). More importantly, because taxpayers' money was used to manage the crisis of (mostly private) banks, public bailouts were unsustainable from both a financial and a political perspective.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…closely interconnected banking systems (Deutsche Bank, 2014). Bank resolutions were costly, indeed, during the 2008-2012 period, with public interventions amounting to roughly 600 billion euros (excluding guarantee schemes), that is, 4.6% of the European gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 (Benczur et al, 2017). More importantly, because taxpayers' money was used to manage the crisis of (mostly private) banks, public bailouts were unsustainable from both a financial and a political perspective.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These new developments in banking rules were also followed by academics with the release of several papers on the topic during the early days of this new regulatory framework. This proves the efforts and the paramount importance that this topic represents for academic researchers [55,56]. However, as this work points out, the current status of the academic literature on the topic is neither as sizeable nor as deep as it should be in order to fully understand the strengths and potential side effects of the new banking resolution framework.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…The leave-one-out model allows measuring the systemic risk of commercial banks on the basis of the subjacent SYMBOL model, proposed by De Lisa et al [38], initially used to simulate the loss distribution of the deposit insurance scheme, and later adopted by the European Commission to evaluate bank-related policies [43][44][45] and for assessing the possible effects of banking crises on public finances stability [46][47][48][49][50].…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%