Evaluating the Contributions of Track-two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90

Abstract

This article evaluates the political impact of three non-official, track-two initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict in South Africa. Meetings between white South Africans and the African National Congress (ANC) in the pre-negotiation period from 1985 to 1990 produced direct, substantive inputs into official, track-one decisionmaking regarding negotiations, as well as indirect inputs into public opinion and party politics bearing on questions of negotiated settlement. Track-two talks are credited with changing the political risks and rewards of official talks by legitimizing the negotiation option and desensitizing each side's constituents to talks with the enemy, by building latent support for track-one negotiations, by furthering incentive-creating political polarization over the issue of negotiation, and by encouraging the formation of liberal, pro-negotiation political parties and NGOs. Track-two talks prepared each side for track-one negotiations by clarifying conflict goals and post-conflict policies; by exploring common ground; by developing cadres of officials with experience in dialogue, some of whom developed a bureaucratic stake in an official negotiation process; and by communicating preconditions for track-one talks. The ANC and government each sought to use track-two talks to divide and weaken the other. A sense of South African identity emerged during track-two dialogues which reduced threat perceptions among white participants who communicated with central decisionmakers, and helped create a sense of negotiation possibility complementary to decisionmakers' sense that negotiation was necessary.

The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions

“…Issues like 'Why did the state actors' attempts to reach a peaceful settlement in South Africa during Apartheid fail?' (see Lieberfeld, 2002) or 'Why were the efforts of the Community of Sant'Egidio so crucial for the effective conflict resolution in Mozambique?' remain underexplored.…”

“…Israelis hold that they will lose too much by accepting the Road Map, while Palestinians believe that the proposal only suits the interests of the USA as an ally of Israel. A less coercive approach than T1 may help overcome such fears of competitiveness, bargaining and biased interests (see Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006b: 333;Lieberfeld, 2002;Mapendere, 2005;Pearson, 2001).…”

Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain

“…After growing concern about the increasing political risks facing businesses in South Africa, not the least of which was the cutoff of international capital in response to the government's repressive tactics in response to the township uprisings, four business executives, five high ranking ANC leaders, and several journalists agreed to meet to further conflict resolution by improving understanding and relationships between groups (Lieberfeld, 2002). According to research on this case (Lieberfeld, 2002), track-two functions changed the political risks and rewards in South Africa by legitimating the negotiation option, breaking the taboo on talks with the enemy, building latent support for official talks, and stimulating pro-negotiation NGOs and political parties. The South African case illustrates the utility and perhaps the necessity of an expansive civil society for effective track-two diplomacy.…”

“…(Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999;Getz, 1990;Kolk and van Tulder, 2002;Steelman and Rivera, 2006;van Tulder and Kolk, 2001) Contributing to a sense of community Demonstrated empirical connections between voice-protected workplaces and more social harmony (Spreitzer, 2007) Corporations can impact peace when their internal policies promote gender equity or at least protect women from harassing situations (Dworkin and Schipani, 2007) Engaging in track-two diplomacy South African business leaders met with African National Congress leaders and changed the political culture (Lieberfeld, 2002) Engaging in conflict sensitive practices/risk assessment Occidental Petroleum, Cerrejon, and NGO Partnerships in Colombia (Guaqueta, 2008) 355 Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain issues of war and peace, business has historically also been involved in various aspects of violent conflict (Nelson, 2000). For example, an often cited example is the British East India Company's role in the expansion of the British Empire.…”

Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy

“…Civil society inclusion can therefore be crucial in avoiding the problem of “spoilers” (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs ), those diverse parties who can derail peace if they believe their interests are not being represented by the other parties at the table. Therefore, potentially opposing groups may need to be included to ensure that their constituencies do not feel excluded, their views are represented, and they do not oppose concessions made by the parties on their behalf (Lieberfeld ; group discussions, Oslo Forum June 22, 2011 and Zanzibar November 25, 2011).…”