2012 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust 2012
DOI: 10.1109/hst.2012.6224318
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Evaluating security requirements in a general-purpose processor by combining assertion checkers with code coverage

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
21
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
4
2
2

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 38 publications
(21 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
0
21
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In the existing literature, [2], [18] propose run-time Trojan detection methods which check whether certain rules are met (e.g whether a certain signal is behaving as expected). If not, then a Trojan is detected.…”
Section: A Meritsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In the existing literature, [2], [18] propose run-time Trojan detection methods which check whether certain rules are met (e.g whether a certain signal is behaving as expected). If not, then a Trojan is detected.…”
Section: A Meritsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Run-time approaches. These approaches monitor for unexpected changes in logical and side-channel behavior to detect Trojans, but do so after the IC has been deployed (e.g., [7], [8], [10], [18]). Resource overheads have been the main disadvantage of run-time monitoring [2].…”
Section: A Hardware Trojans and Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[22][23][24][25][26][27] Some of the proposed techniques in this category are data monitoring by signal probe cells and probe networks, 22 register-transfer (RT) level access rule checking, 23 special monitoring of critical operations such as bus assignment, 24 monitoring analogous characteristics of the circuit 25 and di®erent styles of redundancy-based run-time checking of system behaviors. 26,27 These techniques are mostly introduced in RT or higher levels of design and must be usually customized for the target system.…”
Section: Design For Hardware Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And, just as is the case with software, bugs in the hardware can create vulnerabilities that are exploitable by malicious software [15]. Recent work has demonstrated the efficacy of using assertions built in to the hardware design to protect, post-deployment, against security vulnerabilities [10,11,22]. The assertions act as an execution monitor: each assertion is a proposition encoding a property that should always hold and at run-time the assertion monitors the hardware signals and state named in the property.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some properties seem obviously critical to security. As an example, each of the above cited works ( [10,11,22]) includes an assertion that the supervisor signal is set only in response to a small number of well defined events. Other properties, such as the one(s) violated by Intel's infamous FDIV bug [1,7], feel safely characterized as purely functional.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%