Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration

Zhou, J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1798424

Cited by 9 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Bryant and Eckard [1], Combe et al [2], Harrington and Chang [3], and Zhou [4] estimated the probability of cartel detection in the form of the time-average probability from continuous data. However, the probability of cartel penalization of this study was estimated in the form of the ensemble-average probability from Workload statistics.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the probability of cartel penalization of this study was estimated in the form of the ensemble-average probability from Workload statistics. Bryant and Eckard [1], Combe et al [2], Harrington and Chang [3], Zhou [4], and Miller [7] all assumed that the duration of cartels and the inter-arrival times between cartels follow exponential distributions, and that the stochastic process for cartel cases is stationary. However, we built a Bayesian probabilistic model, as it did not need to consider a stationary process.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They concluded that cartel duration could be a good indicator of whether new competition law had a significant cartel-dissolution effect. Using Harrington and Chang [3]'s model, Zhou [4] analyzed the EC cartel data for 1985-2012, and concluded that the EU's new leniency program in 2002 had the effect of deterring cartels.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the research of Bryant and Eckard [1], Combe et al [2], Harrington and Chang [3], and Zhou [4], the probability of cartel detection-as derived from cartel duration-entailed the determination of the time-average probability from continuous variables. On the other hand, there is research indicating that the probability of cartel detection represents the ensemble-average probability obtained from discrete variables such as caseloads.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He concluded that the introduction of this leniency program in 1993 increased the detection and deterrence capabilities of competition enforcement. The previous research above [1][2][3][4]7] used Markov process models; this research had two notable points.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Bayesian Approach for Estimating the Probability of Cartel Penalization under the Leniency Program

2018

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Cartels cause tremendous damage to the market economy and disadvantage consumers by creating higher prices and lower-quality goods; moreover, they are difficult to detect. We need to prevent them through scientific analysis, which includes the determination of an indicator to explain antitrust enforcement. In particular, the probability of cartel penalization is a useful indicator for evaluating competition enforcement. This study estimates the probability of cartel penalization using a Bayesian approach. In the empirical study, the probability of cartel penalization is estimated by a Bayesian approach from the cartel data of the Department of Justice in the United States between 1970 and 2009. The probability of cartel penalization is seen as sensitive to changes in competition law, and the results have implications for market efficiency and the antitrust authority's efforts against cartel formation and demise. The result of policy simulation shows the effectiveness of the leniency program. Antitrust enforcement is evaluated from the estimation results, and can therefore be improved.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bayesian Approach for Estimating the Probability of Cartel Penalization under the Leniency Program

2018

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The Rise and Fall of Cartels with Multi-market Colluders

Zhou

2016

Rev Ind Organ

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The majority of cartels that were discovered by the European Commission (EC) over the last 30 years involved firms that engaged in collusion in more than one market. I investigate the impacts of the EC's cartel enforcement on the hazards that firms join and leave cartels in multiple markets. I estimate discrete-time recurrent event hazard models for a set of 126 multi-market colluders that were prosecuted between 1985 and 2014. EC investigations in a market decrease the rate at which the cartel members join new cartels and increases the rate at which they leave cartels in other markets. My results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime .Keywords Collusion Á Knock-on effect of antitrust enforcement Á Multi-market cartels

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Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

Hoang

Hüschelrath

Laitenberger

et al. 2014

International Review of Law and Economics

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. DETERMINANTS OF SELF-REPORTING UNDER THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMCung Truong Hoang  , Kai Hüschelrath  , Ulrich Laitenberger * and Florian Smuda # July 2014 AbstractWe empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers. Corresponding author. We are indebted to Eric Helland and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. We are further grateful to Dominic Cucic, Amery Gülker, Bastian Sattelberger and Anne Zirngiebl for excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. Keywords

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Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of European Commission's (EC) new leniency program on the EC's capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is

Cited by 9 publications

References 49 publications

Bayesian Approach for Estimating the Probability of Cartel Penalization under the Leniency Program

Bayesian Approach for Estimating the Probability of Cartel Penalization under the Leniency Program

The Rise and Fall of Cartels with Multi-market Colluders

Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

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