Evaluating Asian Swap Arrangements

Abstract

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CONSTRUCTING an ELIGIBILITY INDEX for THE FEDERAL RESERVE SWAP LINE

“…Refs. [16,18] suggest that the financial and trade linkages with the swap line provider countries have a positive impact on the selection process in swap line agreements, so this study uses six U.S.related indicators for the initial analysis (Table 5).…”

“…Ref. [16] investigate swap line agreements established with the ECB, the Fed, and the PBoC between December 2007 and October 2009. The researchers categorize countries as swap receiver (22 countries) and non-receiver (191 countries) and investigate the significance of foreign exchange reserve, nominal currency depreciation, short-term external debt, export credits, GDP, bilateral trade between the countries of swap line agreement providers on the decision process.…”

Financial dimension in Asian cooperation / Finansowy wymiar współpracy azjatyckiej

“…When a country shows an interest in continuation of drawing of consecutive credit -the cost of the credit is increased by additional 50 basis points in case of every two renewals. The conditions of lending include a ceiling for the cost of drawing new credit, which is 300 basis points [Aizenman et al 2011].…”