Evaluating a Decade of Mobile Termination Rate Regulation

Genakos, Christos; Valletti, Tommaso

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2377341

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…Thus, after FMS has gone on for a sufficiently long time mobile carriers should on balance no longer oppose termination charge reductions. While my conjecture is that for the EC the charge reduction to pure LRIC is only a stepping stone for a move to B&K, Genakos and Valletti (2014) see pure LRIC as a natural end point for termination charge reductions.…”

Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…Building on theoretical models by Armstrong and Wright (2009) The waterbed effect is usually seen as a cushion against profit reductions from termination charge reductions. However, Genakos and Valletti (2014) show that profits on average are not significantly changed as a result of termination charge reductions after 2006 (i.e., without waterbed effect). Thus, after FMS has gone on for a sufficiently long time mobile carriers should on balance no longer oppose termination charge reductions.…”

Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Such an effect would mean that end-user charges would have been increased by mobile carriers as a result of the termination charge reduction Valletti, 2011a andb, 2012;Growitsch et al, 2010). However, new empirical results by Genakos and Valletti (2014) show that the waterbed effect has largely vanished after 2006. This seems to be due to the increasing effect of fixed to mobile substitution (FMS) that has led to a dominance of MTM calls over FTM calls.…”

Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey

Vogelsang

2014

Econ Polit Ind

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Currently, U.S. and EU telecommunications policies differ in many respects. For example, wholesale access to local loops is largely deregulated in the U.S. but continues to be regulated in the EU. Or, the U.S. has an elaborate universal service policy with a set of universal service funds and specific policies for high-cost regions and low-income users, while universal service policies in the EU are much more sporadic. Will the forceful technical and market developments that are associated with IP convergence, next generation access (NGA) and mobile broadband (4G) lead to a convergence of telecommunications policies in the U.S. and EU? Based on a survey of the relevant U.S. and EU related economics literature the current paper addresses this issue for the five policy areas of interconnection, wholesale loop access, net neutrality, spectrum policy and universal service. While IP convergence and the spread of 4G are likely to enhance policy convergence, NGA could have a different effect, because the penetration of and the competitive properties of NGA depend crucially on legacy infrastructures that differ between the two continents. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: L430, L860, L960, L980.

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Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Downward Trend In Termination Chargesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey

Vogelsang

2014

Econ Polit Ind

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“…For some recent analyses, see e.g. Genakos and Valletti (2015), Armstrong andWright (2009), Harbord andHoernig (2015) and Hurkens and Lopez (2014). In our paper we have disregarded this question altogether and focused on cost-based termination rates in our main proofs.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Telephony in Emerging Markets: The Importance of Multi-Simming Customers

Andersson

Göller

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…For example, Genakos and Valletti (2011) found that call termination rate reductions increased retail prices as a result of a 'waterbed effect'. The same authors more recently found that this 'waterbed effect' had disappeared over time (Genakos & Valletti, 2014). However, Kongaut and Bohlin (2012) found that call termination rate reductions have led to decreases in retail prices, while Veronese and Pensendorfer (2009) found no relationship between MTR reductions and retail prices.…”

Section: Theoretical and Empirical Research On The Impact Of Call Termentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Regulation of the Telecommunications Sector in South Africa: 2009-2014

Hawthorne

2015

Afr. j. inf. commun. (Online)

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South Africa's electronic communications sector regulator, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), has a mixed track record in carrying out its mandate. ICASA is part of a regulatory system for the telecommunications sector, that may be characterised as dysfunctional for the following reason: ICASA is not sufficiently independent from government. While regulated entities are generally partially state owned, this does create a conflict of interest for government. Nonetheless, ICASA has had some successes, where the interests of state-owned enterprises coincide with those of consumers. Its interventions in markets for voice services during the course of Telkom Mobile's entry into the market, for example, have resulted in retail voice price reductions of more than 30%. Now that problems relating to voice services markets have largely been resolved through the call termination rate intervention, ICASA needs to shift its focus to markets for broadband services in order to ensure that South Africa becomes more competitive relative to its peers through unbundling the local loop and assigning spectrum for broadband. In order to achieve this, Telkom needs to be fully privatised in order to reduce government pressure to delay local loop unbundling (LLU) and Telkom's wholesale and retail fixed-line operations should be functionally separated. ICASA needs to be further insulated from political interference and be properly resourced through industry levies and fees. Furthermore, a single appellate body for economic regulators ought to be established in order to improve accountability of the regulators and improve outcomes in the sector. There has been relatively little work, however, measuring ICASA's effectiveness in carrying out its mandate in respect of economic regulation of the telecommunications sector, including regulation of access to facilities, interconnection and prices. This paper addresses this gap and contributes towards answering the following questions: How effective is ICASA in fulfilling its role as an economic regulator? How has the wider regulatory system influenced ICASA's performance?ICASA's effectiveness will be evaluated by assessing market outcomes (including pricing, quality and access to services) in respect of voice and broadband services. These two services have been chosen because ICASA's economic regulation activities have focused on them over the period 2009-2014, through its call termination rate and local loop unbundling (LLU) interventions. While this contribution does not amount to a full performance assessment of ICASA, it measures an important aspect of performance, namely market outcomes.First, the methodology is presented. Next, the performance assessment evaluates the regulatory governance framework in South Africa (rules and institutions). Finally, there is a discussion of the impact of ICASA's interventions on voice and broadband services. In each of these sections, regulator interventions and instances of lack of intervention are described, and re...

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Evaluating a Decade of Mobile Termination Rate Regulation

Cited by 7 publications

References 10 publications

Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey

Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey

Mobile Telephony in Emerging Markets: The Importance of Multi-Simming Customers

Economic Regulation of the Telecommunications Sector in South Africa: 2009-2014

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