European voters in the face of crisis: the prominence of unemployment

Rombi, Stefano

doi:10.1017/ipo.2016.7

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…This shift is likely to originate from the split of PdL into FI, which stayed in opposition, and the small center party NCD, which entered the governing coalition. Nevertheless, we confirm Rombi’s (2016) finding that unemployment has been the main driver of Eurosceptic parties’ success at these elections, although especially for those with left-wing inclinations.…”

Section: Do Policy Preferences Of M5s Voters Differ?supporting

confidence: 84%

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The fiscally moderate Italian populist voter: Evidence from a survey experiment

Franchino¹,

Negri

2018

Party Politics

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Do economic policy preferences distinguish populist voters from mainstream ones? We compare the preference profile of the voters of the Five Star Movement (M5S), one of the most successful southern European populist parties, with the profile of voters of other parties at both the 2013 national and the 2014 European Parliament elections by means of a conjoint analysis experiment on economic policy programs. Despite economic insecurity and recent recessions being key drivers of populist voting, we provide evidence that M5S supporters are fiscally moderate: they are happy with the current size of government and oppose more spending. Their Euroscepticism, shared with right-wing voters and representing a new domestic divide, takes the form of a lukewarm support for the euro, which they would readily ditch if it were to improve economic performance.

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Section: Do Policy Preferences Of M5s Voters Differ?supporting

confidence: 84%

“…They also oppose EU-wide spending, especially if financed through additional taxation. The poor performance of the Italian labor market explains the strong demand for employment (Rombi, 2016). This issue will probably be salient during the forthcoming national elections in 2018.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The fiscally moderate Italian populist voter: Evidence from a survey experiment

Franchino¹,

Negri

2018

Party Politics

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“…For example, Hernández and Kriesi (2016) code the Five Star Movement in Italy as a new formation for the 2013 election, whereas the Northern league counts as a radical right party. Rombi (2016), instead, considers both as Eurosceptic. They are all correct.…”

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confidence: 99%

The economic vote at the party level: Electoral behaviour during the Great Recession

Giuliani¹,

Massari

2017

Party Politics

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The Great Recession is a non-trivial test bed for the theory of economic voting, especially if its predictions are decomposed at the party level, as done in this article by analysing the electoral performances of parties competing in 89 national elections held in the 28 member states of the EU between 2003 and 2015. We acknowledge counterintuitively that prime ministers’ parties are able to exploit the relatively good state of the economy, while sharing the blame with their allies in times of crisis, counting on the lack of clarity in the attribution of responsibilities and deploying their heresthetic capacities. We further recognize that new parties, more than opposition ones, proportionally profited from the recession. Tough times magnify the alternation between left- and right-wing victories, without necessarily favouring the most radical parties, whereas the EU’s supposed responsibility in prolonging the crisis fuelled the success of Eurosceptic parties.

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“…For instance, Algan et al (2017) found that increases in unemployment (rather than the level of unemployment) during 2007-2015 were strong predictors of the Brexit vote. In a similar vein, Rombi (2016) shows that the performance of the Eurosceptic parties can be greatly attributed to the increase in unemployment rates. This indicator seems to have also played a significant role in the rise of the Nazi party (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).…”

Section: Key Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 91%

The economic geography of European Union’s discontent: Lessons from Greece

Artelaris

2022

European Urban and Regional Studies

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The regions of the European Union are currently experiencing a period of seismic change that has transformed their established voting patterns and increased anti–European Union voting. Applying objective economic measures, spatial econometrics and municipal voting data from recent elections and a referendum, this study examines the factors shaping anti–European Union votes in Greece. The results indicate a strong link between the country’s changing economic geography and the geography of the anti–European Union vote, providing evidence not only of the ‘geography of discontent’ and the ‘left-behind hypothesis’ but also of the ‘geography of austerity’ associated with the heterogeneous effects of fiscal consolidation and austerity policies.

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European voters in the face of crisis: the prominence of unemployment

Cited by 5 publications

References 49 publications

The fiscally moderate Italian populist voter: Evidence from a survey experiment

The fiscally moderate Italian populist voter: Evidence from a survey experiment

The economic vote at the party level: Electoral behaviour during the Great Recession

The economic geography of European Union’s discontent: Lessons from Greece

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