European Union's tobacco products directive

Evidence-based policy making? The case of Polish opposition to the EU Tobacco Products Directive

“…The Commission deemed that "market, scientific and international developments" that have occurred since the original TPD warrant a revision of the directive [5]. Among the key proposals of the Revision was introducing mandatory pictorial warnings of 75% on top of cigarette packs, the ban on the sale of "slim" cigarettes and adding flavouring to cigarettes, as well as a host of other provisions such as minimum numbers of cigarettes to be sold in a pack or increasing the traceability of tobacco products to prevent smuggling [7]. These revisions were then passed on to a vote in the European Parliament that took place in October 2013.…”

“…The only one exception to this rule were the Polish MEPs who, regardless of their political affiliation, voted for smaller sizes of pictorial warnings, less regulation of tobacco sales, and no ban on "slim" or menthol cigarettes [8]. As a result the European Parliament decided to reduce the size of pictorial warnings to 65% of the pack, not ban the sale of "slims", and permit an eight year transition period before implementing the ban on menthol flavouring [7].…”

“…Making twenty the minimum number of cigarettes in a pack was countered by various "commonsensical" arguments claiming that people will just buy more packets. Similarly, the arguments over the ban on menthols, based on the evidence that they reduce throat irritation and facilitate initiation [7], were dismissed by the Polish media as a minor issue -the public opinion struggled to understand why flavoured tobacco products in particular should be banned [10]. The health advocates also failed to link the most resounding argument, that tobacco use and exposure to second-hand smoke claim well over 700,000 lives in the EU every year, with the particular policies proposed in the TPD Revision.…”

“…Instead, they made sure the evidence they used would be heard and reiterated by associations of Polish farmers, shopkeepers, and other groups with political leverage. The pro-tobacco camp was better at disseminating and communicating its evidence, but it also had the means to do so -according to McKee Philip Morris spent over £1m in 2012 on lobbying MEPs [7]. Finally, it had the advantage of postulating the maintenance of status quo, which is generally favoured by the policymakers to research that suggests radical change [6].…”

Reassessing policy paradigms: A comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries

“…Even where direct engagement is politically problematic, indirect influence persists through the creation of front groups, third party lobbying and funding of political campaigns (Savell et al 2014). Events surrounding the TPD demonstrate the resources and tactics which TTCs are still able to deploy to influence policy debates (McKee 2013). In addition, recent challenges to generic packaging in Australia, by five states under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism, highlight the continuing ability of TTCs to enlist sympathetic governments, and to use international forums to pursue their interests (Jarman et al 2012).…”