2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-51791-5_17
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European Union Agencies

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Cited by 17 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Most scholars agree that EU agencies are not making purely technical decisions (Busuioc and Rimkut_ e, 2020;Egeberg and Trondal, 2017). Arguably, efficient agencies are impossible on a restrictive reading of the Meroni doctrine that constrains delegation of political discretion (Everson et al, 2014). Our argument brings out why the political nature of agency reasoning about political ends is not in and of itself a threat to accountability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…Most scholars agree that EU agencies are not making purely technical decisions (Busuioc and Rimkut_ e, 2020;Egeberg and Trondal, 2017). Arguably, efficient agencies are impossible on a restrictive reading of the Meroni doctrine that constrains delegation of political discretion (Everson et al, 2014). Our argument brings out why the political nature of agency reasoning about political ends is not in and of itself a threat to accountability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…The problems may be exacerbated by institutional turf wars, as can occur even in the most rulebound settings, and especially in international organisations. Technocratic authority in the EU is dispersed across numerous functional agencies at the national and supranational level, often in a state of inter-agency competition (Everson & Vos, 2021). The more power is diffused, the more frictions can be expected.…”
Section: Why Technocracy May Be Prone To Short-termismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are, however, no analyses tracing the development of formal independence over time. The debate about EU agencies' “accountability overload” (Everson & Vos, 2021, p. 316) suggests that EU agencies' independence remains constrained. Considering the intricacies of reaching compromises among principals in reducing control mechanisms and increasing formal independence, we would thus expect gradual changes in EU agencies' formal independence at best.…”
Section: Conceptual Foundations For the Analysis Of Eu Agencies' Form...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, EU agencies have not only obtained more de facto decision‐making tasks (Gehring & Krapohl, 2007; Ruffing, 2022), but also legislators have granted them increasingly vast formal decision‐making tasks (Busuioc, 2013; Curtin & Dehousse, 2012). In the EU's polycrisis of the last decade, EU‐level principals have often resorted to strengthening EU agencies in their crisis responses (Everson & Vos, 2021). Regarding EU agencies' formal independence, the Commission has stressed that EU agencies' formal independence is their functional “raison d'être” (European Commission, 2002).…”
Section: Conceptual Foundations For the Analysis Of Eu Agencies' Form...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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