European Republicanism

Zimmermann, Thilo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25935-8

Cited by 1 publication

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“…This can be a hard question in the case of a complex governance system like the EMU, in which members' cooperation over multiple policy areas creates deep interdependencies as well as externalities. In principle, a republican justification (see Bellamy, 2019;Zimmermann, 2019;Collignon, 2017 for more complete applications of the republican paradigm to the EU) of the over-arching economic rationale of the EMU -namely the smooth functioning of a common European market for goods and services -can be made with reference to the idea that a level-playing-field and sufficiently strong competitive forces help reduce the potential sources of domination associated with market concentration and countries' trade policies. Indeed, the EU's market friendly ethos squares well with the argument proposed by Taylor (2013) in support of competitive markets.…”

Section: Republicanism: Robust Freedom At the International Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These measures increase the level of co-responsibility among Eurozone members and signal to investors that states are not alone when facing asymmetric shocks to their economies. Securing member states non-domination would arguably only be the first step along a more ambitious reform plan that could lead to the establishment of a full-fledged republican union, in which EU citizens truly control supranational institutions (see Zimmermann, 2019).…”

Section: Co-responsibility Against Arbitrary Interferencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone and the institutional preconditions of republican sovereignty

Merlo

2022

Review of Social Economy

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The normative vocabulary of republican political theory can be fruitfully applied to evaluate the phases of market turbulence in sovereign debt markets witnessed during the Eurozone crisis. A view of justice that requires the minimisation of dominating relationships between agents highlights how the institutional preconditions of undominated sovereignty were lacking in the Eurozone. The agreed-upon structure within which countries operated fuelled self-fulfilling market movements in sovereign bond markets, which bear the hallmark of unjust domination as weaker Member States formed a social relationship with investors over which they did not have meaningful control. In motivating the thesis, the paper touches upon the recent debates on the sources and site of domination and on the stance, republican scholars should take toward competitive markets. Given this diagnosis, Eurozone countries have an obligation to establish supranational institutions that increase private and public channels of risk-sharing.

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