2017
DOI: 10.7249/rr1579
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European Relations with Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis

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Cited by 21 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Analysts from the RAND Corporation, an American think tank, also share the assessment that perceptions of Russia differ significantly and that ‘NATO’s western and southern members do not see as immediate a threat from Russia’ (Pezard et al 2017, 5). However, while these countries do not assess Russia as a substantial risk to their security, on the other pole are those countries in close proximity to Russia, which perceive it as an ‘existential threat’ (Pezard et al 2017, 5).…”
Section: Risk and Threat Assessments In Ceementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Analysts from the RAND Corporation, an American think tank, also share the assessment that perceptions of Russia differ significantly and that ‘NATO’s western and southern members do not see as immediate a threat from Russia’ (Pezard et al 2017, 5). However, while these countries do not assess Russia as a substantial risk to their security, on the other pole are those countries in close proximity to Russia, which perceive it as an ‘existential threat’ (Pezard et al 2017, 5).…”
Section: Risk and Threat Assessments In Ceementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is important to understand the causes of these divergent views of Russia, that is, the factors and drivers that influence perceptions of Russia. According to the RAND analysts, ‘a critical factor influencing European perceptions of the military threat posed by Russia appears to be geographical proximity to Russia’ (Pezard et al 2017, 5).…”
Section: Risk and Threat Assessments In Ceementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, as abovementioned in Chapter 2, the discussions on a defense plan for the Baltic region and Poland were already underway in September 2014. While Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia along with Poland located in the geographical proximity to Russia, made the case for the NATO forward presence, much more powerful members of the alliance, such as Germany insisted only on maintaining the ability of rapid deployment of the collective forces in case of Russian military aggression (Pezard et al, 2017).…”
Section: Size Of Armed Forcesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While during the discussions in Wales Summit in September 2014, Poland and Baltic states, which are geographically closer to Russia, supported the option of NATO's military forward presence, other NATO members such as Germany, fearing to further escalate relations with Moscow, opposed this option and appealed for establishing the ability to rapidly deploy forces in case of Russian military aggression. Finally, after the discussions the allies have chosen the second option and thus agreed on the preferred course of action in the field of collective defense (Pezard et al, 2017).…”
Section: Cooperation Problems and Patterns Of Cooperationmentioning
confidence: 99%