European Political Co‐operation and the United States*

Pardalis, Anastasia

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1987.tb00295.x

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The content of these declarations ranges from noncommital rhetoric, through protests, to the imposition of economic sanctions and the promise of financial assistance. Although these statements are (Pardalis 1987), other authors state ': : : it is possible to identify a moving together of views from originally differing positions of the member-states in important areas of international politics' (Wessels 1982: 5).…”

Section: A Gradual Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Schneider¹,

Seybold²

1997

Eur J Political Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Traditional integration theories disagree over the scope of the main foreign policy instrument of the European Union (EU), the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC). While intergovernmentalism suggests that EPC actions are weak, neofunctionalism maintains that cooperation within the EPC framework is characterised by strong measures. In this article, we present a game-theoretic and statistical analysis of these conflicting propositions and show that European foreign policy making is much more diversified than predicted by the predominating theoretical approaches. A signalling game demonstrates that the exploitation of uncertainty by a possible profit-seeker outside the organisation can cause inadequate EPC decisions. The formal model also explores the extent to which joint interest in closer foreign policy coordination can help to overcome diverging national policy preferences. The empirical test of some game-theoretic hypotheses shows that European foreign policy making has become more intensive. The increasing number of declarations is, however, also a sign of the proliferation of non-committing statements. Logit regressions reveal a close relationship between the economic salience of an EPC target nation to the European Union and the intensity of an EPC reaction.

show abstract

Section: A Gradual Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Schneider¹,

Seybold²

1997

Eur J Political Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although these statements are the main tool of the foreign policy making process, there is some disagreement about their relative importance. While some have argued that EPC declarations avoid substance (Pardalis 1987), other authors state ': : : it is possible to identify a moving together of views from originally differing positions of the member-states in important areas of international politics' (Wessels 1982: 5).…”

Section: A Gradual Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Schneider¹,

Seybold²

1997

European J Political Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Traditional integration theories disagree over the scope of the main foreign policy instrument of the European Union (EU), the so‐called European Political Cooperation (EPC). While intergovernmentalism suggests that EPC actions are weak, neofunctionalism maintains that cooperation within the EPC framework is characterised by strong measures. In this article, we present a game‐theoretic and statistical analysis of these conflicting propositions and show that European foreign policy making is much more diversified than predicted by the predominating theoretical approaches. A signalling game demonstrates that the exploitation of uncertainty by a possible profit‐seeker outside the organisation can cause inadequate EPC decisions. The formal model also explores the extent to which joint interest in closer foreign policy coordination can help to overcome diverging national policy preferences. The empirical test of some game‐theoretic hypotheses shows that European foreign policy making has become more intensive. The increasing number of declarations is, however, also a sign of the proliferation of non‐committing statements. Logit regressions reveal a close relationship between the economic salience of an EPC target nation to the European Union and the intensity of an EPC reaction.

show abstract

“…10 Outside influences, particularly US policies, have also been cited as a general motivation for EU foreign policy cooperation (Nuttall, 1992) and it is clear that EPC/CFSP provides an outlet for the EU to express differences with America. However, the argument about US influence must be substantially qualified: although America has consistently called for greater defense burden-sharing in Europe, its attitude toward EPC/CFSP initiatives has varied from outright opposition to indifference to support (sometimes within the same presidential administration), and many US policies have the potential to divide as well as unite Europe (Pardalis, 1987;Peterson, 1996). Thus we cannot explain the pursuit of EPC/CFSP only or even primarily in terms of American pressures.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation

Smith

2004

European Journal of International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The expansion of European Union (EU) foreign policy cooperation since 1970 presents a number of puzzles for theorists of regional integration and International Relations. It is not directed by supranational organizations, does not involve bargaining over policy alternatives, and is not dominated by the largest EU states. Nor do the EU's common foreign policy decisions reflect 'lowest common denominator' preferences. Instead, cooperation has been achieved through decentralized institutional mechanisms, involving processes associated with both intergovernmental and social constructivist theories. This article first explains how changes in institutional context-in terms of intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational proceduresaffect the propensity for cooperation. It then links processes of institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy cooperation among EU member states. Finally, it explores three policy areas (the Middle East, South Africa and nuclear non-proliferation) where EU states have adjusted their national foreign policies in line with EU foreign policy norms. KEY WORDS ♦ Common Foreign and Security Policy ♦ European Union foreign policy ♦ European Political Cooperation ♦ institutionalization ♦ international cooperation The Maastricht Treaty on European Union clearly marks a new era in the theory and practice of European integration. Much of the scholarly attention in this area focuses on the European Union's (EU) socioeconomic policy domains, primarily in terms of developing the single European market (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998). 1 This achievement, however, tends to overshadow an increasingly prominent area of European integration-the pursuit of a common foreign policy. Foreign policy cooperation has been

show abstract

European Political Co‐operation and the United States*

Cited by 5 publications

References 11 publications

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Twelve tongues, one voice: An evaluation of European political cooperation

Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About