Abstract:In this paper we investigate the stock market response to international monetary policy changes in the UK and Germany. Specifically, we analyse the impact of (un)expected changes in UK and German/euro area policy rates on UK and German aggregate and sectoral stock returns in an event study. The decomposition of the (un)expected changes in policy rates are based on futures markets. Overall, our results suggest that, UK monetary policy surprises have a significant negative influence on both aggregate and industr… Show more
“…There is good evidence that monetary policy responses to asset prices are themselves asymmetric (Mayes & Viren, 2011 for the euro area; D'Agostino, Sala, & Surico, 2005 for the US) but little in the reverse direction, although Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) find that stock price responses to positive macroeconomic news, including that from interest rates, is positive in expansions and negative in contractions. 1 Simply put, it is normally thought, on the basis of previous evidence (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005;Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, & O'Reilly, 2007a;Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, & O'Reilly, 2007b;Honda & Kuroki, 2006;Wongswan, 2005), that if there is a positive interest rate surprise this will encourage markets to fear that there is more adverse information available to the central bank than they had thought existed and hence the stock price response would be negative. However, in uncertain times such a surprise might lead markets to believe that policy will be more conducive to steady growth in the future, as the central bank appears more determined to maintain price stability than was previously thought.…”
“…There is good evidence that monetary policy responses to asset prices are themselves asymmetric (Mayes & Viren, 2011 for the euro area; D'Agostino, Sala, & Surico, 2005 for the US) but little in the reverse direction, although Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) find that stock price responses to positive macroeconomic news, including that from interest rates, is positive in expansions and negative in contractions. 1 Simply put, it is normally thought, on the basis of previous evidence (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005;Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, & O'Reilly, 2007a;Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, & O'Reilly, 2007b;Honda & Kuroki, 2006;Wongswan, 2005), that if there is a positive interest rate surprise this will encourage markets to fear that there is more adverse information available to the central bank than they had thought existed and hence the stock price response would be negative. However, in uncertain times such a surprise might lead markets to believe that policy will be more conducive to steady growth in the future, as the central bank appears more determined to maintain price stability than was previously thought.…”
“…Intra-daily data is unavailable to us, so we use the change in end-of-day closing prices surrounding ECB Governing Council decisions. In contrast to Federal funds futures, we do not require a scale factor for the Euribor futures to account for the days remaining in the month after a policy action (Bredin et al, 2009;Brand, Buncic, and Turunen, 2010). However, we account for illiquidity toward the maturity of the futures contracts and use the second closest-to-delivery contract instead of the current series whenever there are less than 5 days between the policy event and the next final settlement day.…”
Section: Appendix a The Construction Of The Ecb Monetary Policy Shocksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We follow the standard event study approach to identify the surprise component of ECB monetary policy announcements (see Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, and O'reilly, 2009;León and Sebestyén, 2012; Haitsma, Unalmis, and de Haan, 2016, among others). Different from the US, for which federal fund futures rates are available, there are no futures market instruments that track the Euro Area policy rate.…”
We examine the credit channel of monetary policy from 2000 to 2015 in the Euro Area using daily monetary policy shock and credit risk measures in an autoregressive distributed lag model. We find that an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to a short-run increase in the credit risk of non-financial corporations. This dysfunctionality of the credit channel is driven by the crisis-dominated post-2009 period. During this period, market participants may have interpreted expansionary monetary policy shocks as a signal of worsening economic prospects. We further distinguish policy shocks aiming at short-and long-run expectations of market participants, i.e. target and path shocks. The adverse effect disappears for crisis countries when the European Central Bank targets long-run rather than short-run expectations.
“…For instance, Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche, and Reilly (2009) investigate via an event study the stock market response to unexpected changes in the U.K. and euro area monetary policy rates. The results are mixed.…”
This paper investigates the impact of the European Central Bank's unconventional monetary surprises on major European stock markets. Three measures for surprises are used: (a) the change in domestic 10‐year government bond yields, (b) the change in the spread between German and Italian (Spanish) 10‐year bond yields, and (c) the change in yields of a safe euro‐denominated asset, such as German bonds. I show that unconventional monetary policy surprises significantly influence stock returns. For instance, monetary decisions that cause a decrease in Italian (Spanish) sovereign spread led to an increase in the stock returns. In addition, I find that a positively surprising shock—a fall in the domestic bond yield and an increase in German interest rates—leads to higher stock returns. Finally, sovereign spreads seemed to have larger effects on stock returns both during crisis and postcrisis years.
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