Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo

Dobbins, James; Jones, Seth G.; Crane, Keith; Chivvis, Christopher S.; Radin, Andrew; Larrabee, F.; Bensahel, Nora; Lawson, Brooke Stearns; Goldsmith, Benjamin E.

doi:10.7249/mg722

Cited by 24 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…The theory implies that regions of particular interest to major or regional powers will be more likely to receive delegation deals (shown in Matanock ), but major powers are also increasingly active in assisting weak states around the globe due to more diffuse transnational security threats (broadly, for example, among a set of RAND reports by this team; see Dobbins et al. ; Fortna ). This section shows that fuller delegation is effective even on complex tasks, while the constraints associated with partial delegation make it suited only to simpler tasks.…”

Section: Evaluating Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…RAMSI's mandate was expanded by the Solomon Islands’ prime minister after ethnic unrest in 2006, and it has so far been maintained despite exit clauses, so it clearly has a sufficient domestic coalition (Dobbins et al. , 191). When RAMSI entered, it substituted highly institutionalized external capacity for the small host state: RAMSI brought over 2,000 personnel and a projected $1 billion over time to the Solomon Islands, which had a population of less than a half million and an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of less than $1 billion (McMullan and Peebles ).…”

Section: Evaluating Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Matanock

2014

Governance

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Governance delegation agreements—international treaties allowing external actors legal authority within host states for fixed terms—succeed in simple and, under certain conditions, complex state‐building tasks. These deals are well institutionalized and have input legitimacy because ratification requires sufficient domestic support from a ruling coalition. In order to obtain that input legitimacy, however, host states constrain external actors commensurate with their level of statehood: Stronger states delegate less legal authority. This article argues that these constraints, which produce joint rather than complete authority, require external actors to work within state structures rather than substituting for them, and thus make coordination of complex tasks more difficult. A quantitative overview of data on consent‐based peacekeeping missions complements a qualitative analysis focused on comparative case studies in Melanesia and Central America to test the theory. The results support the theory and suggest that these deals hold promise particularly for accomplishing complex tasks in especially weak states.

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Section: Evaluating Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Evaluating Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Matanock

2014

Governance

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“…Operational coordination was facilitated by a division of labour between the EU's political and military commands, which liaised with the respective partners in the UN. 40 The EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006 was also reportedly successful in terms of EU -UN cooperation. It reconfirmed the EU's commitment to 'effective multilateralism' and was its first successful application of the 'standby model', which was identified by both organizations as one of the possible modes of inter-organizational cooperation.…”

Section: Cooperation Problems Between the Eu And The Un In Conflict Amentioning

confidence: 95%

Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The Interplay of the EU and the UN in Conflict and Crisis Management

Peters¹

2011

Contemporary Security Policy

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“…Their comparative advantage has been in policing, low-intensity operations and peacekeeping. Studies conclude that Europe-led peacekeeping operations are more efficiently and effectively run than American operations (Dobbins et al, 2008).…”

Section: Europe: the World's Second Military Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Europe: The quiet superpower

Moravcsik

2009

Fr Polit

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This article challenges the conventional view that Europe's global influence is declining. Since 1989 realists have predicted Europe's demise, as well as greater intra-European and transatlantic conflict. The reverse has occurred. This outcome suggests the superior predictive power of liberal international relations theory, which stresses the importance of the varied national interests of states, reflecting specific social coalitions, patterns of global interdependence and domestic institutions. According to a liberal analysis, Europe is and will foreseeably remain the only superpower besides the United States in a bipolar world -and its relative power is rising. Europe is the world's pre-eminent civilian power, and its second military power, far more influential than China or India. None of this is likely to change much, because Europe's influence rests on stable factors such as high per capita income, long-term institutional advantages and convergence of underlying national interests between European countries and other great powers, notably the United States.

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Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The Interplay of the EU and the UN in Conflict and Crisis Management

Europe: The quiet superpower

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