EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics

Abstract

The concept of external governance seeks to capture the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. This article elaborates the theoretical foundations of this concept, differentiates the various institutional modes through which external governance takes place and suggests a set of hypotheses addressing the conditions under which EU external governance is effective. Here, we contrast institutionalist explanations, which are the most germane to an external governance approach, with competing expectations derived from power-based theories and approaches emphasizing the role of domestic factors in the target countries.

Beyond geopolitics: exploring the impact of the EU and Russia in the “contested neighborhood”

“…There has been a wide array of research under the heading of "neighborhood Europeanization" and external governance, which has predominantly studied the bilateral impact of the EU on domestic developments in neighboring countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009;Langbein and Börzel 2013). Despite increased attention to domestic-level and agency-centered explanations, the Europeanization literature in general has been criticized as being EU-centered, top-down, and still too inattentive to domestic forces of change (Börzel and Risse 2012).…”

“…The impact of the EU and Russia on domestic change is limited, selective, and often shallow. In general, rule selection -defined as the rules that an NC formally subscribes to in international negotiations or agreements with external actors (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) -tends to be driven by integration aspirations (Langbein and Wolczuk 2012). Nevertheless, participation in these macro-frameworks shapes domestic changes only to a limited and selective extent.…”

“…We explore how the instances of sectoral change can be traced back to domestic preferences and to the EU's and Russia's policies. We endeavor to distinguish between formal (legislative) and de facto changes (Börzel and Risse 2012) or -put differently -between rule selection and adoption and actual implementation at the sectoral level (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).…”

North Africa and the Making of Europe : Governance, Institutions and Culture

“…The literature on 'external governance', i.e. the transfer of EU rules and policies to third countries, often at a level below the threshold of membership (Lavenex, 2004;Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009), observes that the EU is in fact engaged in Europeanization processes as a part of its foreign policy. This body of research has illustrated the way in which the EU exports its laws and regulations to the Neighbourhood, but also how these countries contest and negotiate aspects of European norms, both through formal negotiations and adaptation, and above all through varying application of formally adopted norms (Freyburg et al, 2009;Gänzle, 2009;Youngs, 2009a).…”

Constraining external governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the Ukraine

“…Given the fact that Russia, as a centre of power, poses very considerable constraints for EU external governance, we put interdependence 1 , the key variable determining Russia's power and ability to limit EU's policy extension, at the centre of our analysis. Rather than arguing, as the institutional model formulated by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) does, that the degree of existing institutionalization affects the success of external governance, we see interdependence as the driving force for institutionalization. For example, the EU started formulating an energy strategy and institutionalizing a policy internally because it needs to deal with energy dependence on Russia and transit dependence on Ukraine.…”