2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2398914
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EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after 'Two Pack'

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…In an effort to manage the inordinate size of Greece’s sovereign debt and overcome the country’s consequent inability to access bond markets, previous governments had already received two bailout packages from the Troika, the first in 2010 and the second in 2012. Each of those packages had come, on the one hand, with a broad range of strict conditions such as austerity measures, the further deregulation of the labour market, the sale of valuable public assets, and in-depth public administration reforms; and, on the other hand, with heavy involvement on the part of creditors in domestic policy-making more generally and their close oversight of the implementation of the measures at issue (Ioannidis, 2014). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Troika’s intervention was harsher in Greece – whether in terms of the content of the specific measures demanded, control over broader policy design dealing with social and economic matters, or supervision of pertinent implementation procedures – than in other countries of the European periphery (Clifton et al, 2018).…”
Section: Greece’s Economic Crisis and The Ascent Of Syriza-led Governmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In an effort to manage the inordinate size of Greece’s sovereign debt and overcome the country’s consequent inability to access bond markets, previous governments had already received two bailout packages from the Troika, the first in 2010 and the second in 2012. Each of those packages had come, on the one hand, with a broad range of strict conditions such as austerity measures, the further deregulation of the labour market, the sale of valuable public assets, and in-depth public administration reforms; and, on the other hand, with heavy involvement on the part of creditors in domestic policy-making more generally and their close oversight of the implementation of the measures at issue (Ioannidis, 2014). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Troika’s intervention was harsher in Greece – whether in terms of the content of the specific measures demanded, control over broader policy design dealing with social and economic matters, or supervision of pertinent implementation procedures – than in other countries of the European periphery (Clifton et al, 2018).…”
Section: Greece’s Economic Crisis and The Ascent Of Syriza-led Governmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For ETOs to be affirmed based on the jurisdictional models summarised above, attribution of conduct to a state is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition: it is a conduct of the state or, in the case of the IACtHR 'cause-and-effect' model, a (at least partly) territorial conduct over which that state has effective control, that de facto creates the conditions for affirming the extraterritorial exercise by that state of its IHRL jurisdiction, further based on the additional elements of de jure/physical control or ability to influence the enjoyment of human rights abroad. Especially in the context of multilateral debt, the direct attribution of conduct having negative human rights effects -e.g., the adoption of austerity measures, which tends to involve: a) multiple actors (including international organisations, private actors and the, at least formally, consenting territorial state); b) complex decision-making processes; and c) instruments, such as Memoranda of Understanding, characterised by a certain 'opacity' in terms of the role, relative bargaining power and legitimacy of the actors involved (Ioannidis 2014;Costamagna 2012) -to specific (creditor) states for the purposes of any of the jurisdictional models summarised above, may prove arduous (for a significant attempt, however, see De . The relevant acts/omissions may be more easily formally attributable to the territorial state or to an international organisation (the involvement of the territorial state may be also -although not necessarily successfully -raised by creditor states and international organisations as a legal defence against their international responsibility).…”
Section: Issue 1 States As Main Etos-bearersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The MoU on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality is signed by the Commission on behalf of the EU lenders, and approved by the Eurogroup, the informal meetings of the finance ministers of the Eurozone. Conditionality is mainly defined at staff-level negotiations, and only a small number of domestic actors are involved, mainly Ministers and some key advisors (Ioannidis, 2014). In the case of non-euro area memorandum countries, the Commission has an even more central role, as it is not acting on behalf of the Eurozone Member States as lenders, and the ECB is not involved.…”
Section: The Making Of the Eu Guidance: Opening The Black Boxmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Between the Commission and the ECB there is a hierarchy, since the European Commission operates 'in liaison with the ECB'. The role of the IMF as a minority lender is less certain (Ioannidis, 2014).…”
Section: The Making Of the Eu Guidance: Opening The Black Boxmentioning
confidence: 99%