EU Eligibility, Central Europe, and the Invention of Applicant State Narrative

Abstract

This article is about changing regional understandings in Europe and how those changed understandings reflect and shape contemporary geopolitical arrangements in the context of the eastward enlargement of the EU. It is argued in the article that two interrelated questions form the basis of the identity assumption of the eastern enlargement of the Union. First, where Europe's eastern boundary lies, and, second, how the eastern boundary is connected to the region-building, identity formation and moral language within the EU both at national and supranational scales. Special emphasis is given to a national moral language rather than to a supranational one, since, as argued in the article, national and European identities do not need to be mutually exclusive phenomena, but can bolster each other. The boundary between the EU and the 'East' is formed particularly through the national identity politics of the post-communist states applying for membership, and boundary drawing is a result of the 'European criteria' set down by the EU as well as the communist experience of the applicant states. It became a spatial strategy for the post-communist applicant states to locate themselves in historical and geographical Central Europe -the imagined moral heart of Europe -by separating themselves from the signifier 'East' in order to gain recognition as European in the early 1990s. This new narrative is argued to be particularly important for the post-Cold War national identity projects of the applicant states.

Constructing and Crossing Boundaries in a New (?) Europe

“…the EU) were re-interpreted, and the changing sense of nation/nationhood was widely discussed throughout Europe (Paasi, 2001;Simonsen, 2004). The spread of terms of the 'new Europe' and 'East and Central Europe' in geopolitical discourses -that largely shaped ongoing debates in postsocialist countries -rested on the idea of including post-socialist countries in Europe as a place and also as an institute (the EU) (Moisio, 2002;Clark, 2002). Nevertheless, it referred also to the process of 'othering': the exclusion of '… backward, violent, extremely nationalist countries…' (Simonsen, 2004, p. 358), and (re-)defining Europe as a bounded space, primarily, in relation to Russia (Moisio, 2002;Simonsen, 2004).…”

“…Nevertheless, dissolving the state control over everyday life was a significant issue in post-socialist political discourses, thus, the role and the values and norms that the nation state rested upon had to be re-defined thoroughly in post-socialist countries. This process was tied intimately to the issue of being part of Europe (Moisio, 2002;Kostovicova, 2004): in post-socialist political rhetoric, it represented the 'return' to democratic traditions, historical continuity (rejecting the socialist past, stressing the 'modern' and 'western' roots of the sovereign, territorialised nation state) and also adopting a model for 'working capitalism' to remedy the crisis of post-socialist restructuring (Young and Light, 2001;Paasi, 2001;Moisio, 2002;Ziegler, 2002). Nevertheless, free trade and well-functioning market economy raised also the issue of changing meanings of national borders due to globalisation, rise of network economies and intensified cross-border relations (Paasi, 2001) -questioning the significance of a pillar (the territorialised nation state) that 'newly born' post-socialist identities rested on (Young and Light, 2001).…”

“…The spread of terms of the 'new Europe' and 'East and Central Europe' in geopolitical discourses -that largely shaped ongoing debates in postsocialist countries -rested on the idea of including post-socialist countries in Europe as a place and also as an institute (the EU) (Moisio, 2002;Clark, 2002). Nevertheless, it referred also to the process of 'othering': the exclusion of '… backward, violent, extremely nationalist countries…' (Simonsen, 2004, p. 358), and (re-)defining Europe as a bounded space, primarily, in relation to Russia (Moisio, 2002;Simonsen, 2004). Such discourses manifested in including postsocialist countries in Europe as an institute (Paasi, 2001), that resulted in highly complex and overlapping structures of spaces and boundaries, that (particularly, 53 being included in/excluded form the 'common market', the euro-zone, and the Schengen system) largely shaped the everyday practices of people living border regions (Walters 2002).…”

“…Interpreting geopolitics as '…a discoursive practice by which intellectuals of "state-craft" spatialise international politics in such a way as to present it as a "world" characterised by particular types of places, peoples and dramas' (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 192), re-definition of the nation (interwoven with ethno-cultural problems), moreover, the re-positioning of postsocialist states in Europe shall be interpreted as tools of national political elites to support and legitimise the transition process (Smith, 1998;Moisio, 2002;Kostovicova, 2004). The conflicts of the former Yugoslav states that have been discussed in a wider geopolitical and historical context (e.g.…”

The revival of 'Central Europe' among Hungarian political elites: its meaning and geopolitical implications

“…What they all agreed on was that Central Europe was also to be defined against Russia (ibid) and perceived as an unquestionable part of the West. These ideas led to shaping a narrative on the need to 'return to Europe', eagerly adopted by politicians as a legitimacy for these countries' integration into various western alliances such as the EU (Moisio, S. 2002). Yet once 'Central Europe' filled that purpose, it was much less often invoked.…”